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Abstract 
.This thesis is a metaphilosophical investigation into how food can be handled 
philosophically. The first chapter considers the question of whether food can be the 
subject matter of philosophy, and concludes that there are three possible ways: Foodist 
Philosophy, Philosophy of Food, and Philosophy and Food. This thesis focuses on the 
category Foodist Philosophy. The second chapter develops an account of foodist 
philosophy: it is a style of philosophy that assumes that our food and eating practices are 
fundamental aspects of the human condition. The third chapter analyses Plato's concept 
oflove in the Symposium and these conclusions are objected to in a foodist critique in the 
fourth chapter. 
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Chapter 1 
Can food be the subject matter of philosophy? 
1.1 Introduction 
In this thesis I undertake a metaphilosophical investigation into how food can be handled 
philosophically. Metaphilosophy studies the nature of philosophy. I investigate two main 
areas: how food can be understood philosophically and what these conclusions can tell us 
about the nature of philosophy itself. I also offer an example of 'foodist philosophy' as a 
tool to critique and reread Plato's Symposium. 
1.2 A Note on Terminology 
I use the tern1 'food' in the broadest possible sense to cover a range of substances and 
practices. Firstly, 'food' may refer to the substances that we consume, e.g. 
avocados,cheese, wine etc. Secondly, 'food' covers the human practices that are 
associated with food in the first sense, such as growing, preparing, cooking, and eating. 
1.3 The Philosophy of Food: a History of Philosophical Neglect 
Curtin and Heldke (1992: xiii) claim that Western philosophers have "persistently 
ignored - or marginalized - one of the most common and pervasive sources of value in 
human experience - our relations with food." For most philosophers, the subject of food 
does not warrant philosophical enquiry. 
Boisvert (www.siena.edu/boisvert/PhFoodintro.htm) suggests that the denigration of 
food as a philosophical subject began as early as Plato, who argued that food is an 
"annoyance" for the "real philosopher". In Phaedo, Plato writes: 
'Do you think it is right for a philosopher to concern himself with the so-called 
pleasures connected with food and drink?' 
'Certainly not, Socrates,' said Simmias. 
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Boisvert further argues that Descartes' dualistic heritage values the abstract above the 
embodied, and as a result, activities associated with bodily activities (such as food and 
. eating) are unworthy of philosophical enquiry. 
Curtin and Heldke offer another reason for the historical philosophical neglect of 
food. They argue that in most cultures, food practices are generally activities associated 
with women's work and the work of slaves or the lower classes. Historically, Western 
cultures have tended to ignore or denigrate the value of women's activities and the 
absence of the philosophy of food reflects the sexist and classist attitudes that are implicit 
in the tradition of Western philosophy. 
Another possible (comical) answer is one stated by Jeremy Iggers (2001), a 
philosopher and restaurant critic, who writes that perhaps the "real reason for their [i.e. 
philosophers] neglect is that food and our habits of eating are too important to us to 
jeopardise with dangerous philosophical rumination". He continues to offer a bit of what 
he calls "Anlerican folk wisdom: don't shit where you eat," and quotes St Thomas 
Aquinas, who said at the end of his philosophic career that all of his philosophical work 
added up to a "pi le of straw". Iggers further comments that "it doesn't seem far fetched to 
imagine that Aquinas had in mind straw that had passed through a horse". 
An example that demonstrates this philosophical neglect of food would be how 
philosophers have persistently ignored and devalued the sense of taste. Korsmeyer's 
(1999) project in Making Sellse a/Taste: Food and Philosophy presents a philosophical 
investigation into the sense of taste. By taste, she means literal taste, not merely a 
metaphor for aesthetic discrimination or artistic judgements. She writes, "philosophers 
have generally concurred that pursuit of taste for pleasure alone seems an unfit 
preoccupation for a being whose higher capacities require the efforts of rationality" 
(Korsmeyer 1999: I) . The reason why taste has been omitted from an epistemological 
discussion of sense perception is because it is closely identified with our bodies and our 
animal natures - it is thought to be a "base temptation" that threatens our moral life, and 
furthermore there is "no disputing about taste" (Korsmeyer 1999: 1-2). Traditionally, 
philosophers have deemed vision and hearing to be the "intellectual" or "cognitive" 
senses and hence the "higher" senses, while taste, touch and smell have been thought to 
be the "bodily" and hence "lower" senses (Korsmeyer 1999: 3). Korsmeyer argues that 
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eating and food and hence the sense of taste - are important phenomena in our lives and 
worthy of philosophical investigation. 
1.4 Why Food and Philosophy, and Why Now? 
Just because the tradition of Western philosophy has ignored food does not explain why it 
should start analysing food now or why food is worthy of philosophical enquiry. There 
are subjects and phenomena that do not warrant philosophical investigation, for example 
tornados or doorknobs. So what is it about food that justifies this research project? 
In Elizabeth Telfer's (1996: 1) book, Foodfor Thought: Philosophy and Food, she 
distinguishes "feeding and watering" from "eating and drinking". The former is necessary 
for survival of all animals, whereas the latter is only practiced by humans and contains a 
value that goes beyond mere sustenance. Philosophy can analyse this value. Here are 
various quotes that attempt to capture the value of eating and drinking: 
Food, like sex, is a writer's great opportunity. It offers material that is both 
universal and intensely personal - something that illuminates the nature of 
humankind but also offers insights into the unique and intimate foibles of an 
individual.. .Food is about agriculture, about ecology, about man's relationship 
with nature, about the climate, about nation-building, cultural struggles, friends 
and enemies, alliances, wars, religion. It is about memory and tradition and, at 
times, even about sex. (Kurlansky 2002: 1) 
Food and eating habits are banal practices of everyday life, we all, as living 
beings must eat to survive. This apparent banality is deceptive. Food and eating 
habits and preferences are not simply matters of "fuelling" ourselves, all eviating 
hunger pangs, or taking enjoyment in gustatory sensations. Food and eating are 
central to our subjectivity, or sense of self, and our experience of embodiment, or 
the ways that we live in and through our bodies, which itself is inextricably linked 
with sUbjectivity. (Lupton 1996: 1) 
Man has been defined as a rational animal, a laughing animal, a tool-using animal 
and so on. We would be touching upon a deep truth about him, however, if we 
called him a cooking animal. (Versfeld 1991: 16) 
A further distinction I would like to make is the difference between hunger, appetite, 
and eating .. Stephen Mennell (1992) in an article entitled "On the Civilizing of Appetite" 
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argues that we must not conflate hunger with appetite. Hunger is the bodily drive that 
occurs in all humans whereas appetite is a "state of mind, an inner mental awareness of 
. desire that is the setting for hunger" (Capon quoted by MennellI992: 316). While, 
hunger is physical, appetite is the psychological state of a person's desire to eat and a 
person's hunger and appetite are linked by an "appestat" which is a "psychological (not 
physiological) control mechanism regulating food intake" (MennellI992: 316). The 
underlying hunger drive, psychological processes and social pressures determine this 
"appestat" setting. That all humans experience hunger is perhaps not that philosophically 
interesting, but how humans experience and respond to this biological drive i.e. through 
appetite and "appestat" - I believe is worthy of philosophical enquiry. 
Food has also become an important contemporary issue. Roger Scruton 
(http ://www.opendemocracy.net/content/a11iclesIPDF/1224.pdD shows that food is the 
single common factor to most "widely mourned developments" in modem society. He 
lists such phenomena as the clearance of the rain forests, the disappearance of the family 
meal and the culture of fast food and claims, "the place of food in moral, political and 
monetary economy has changed radically in the last fifty years". Hence, the role of food 
has become highly significant, not only on an individual but also on a global level. 
1.5 Philosophy as a Creative Moment 
It is a philosopher who understands that things can no longer be seen as they were 
before. Phi losophy starts where the natural stagnation of thought and language is 
broken in a creative moment of finding new concepts and new ideas. Philosophy 
is creation . (Dorfman 2004: 172) 
Given the context of the philosophical neglect of food, I argue that it is important that this 
area be explored philosophically. I believe that it is important for the discipline of 
philosophy to explore "new concepts and new ideas" and hence to investigate how 
philosophy and food can come together and can inform each other. I aim to investigate 
and, hopefully, to contribute to our understanding of philosophy and food . 
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The aim of the thesis is to legitimate and illustrate a philosophical enquiry into the 
subject matter offood. I begin by outlining ways in which philosophy, as a field, can be 
,directed at food. Specifically my goals are: 
• to show that philosophical questions relating to food are important, and 
• to show that these questions about food can be answered using philosophical 
methodology. 
I suggest a threefold division of ways in which philosophy can be about food. These 
are 'Foodist Philosophy', 'Philosophy of Food' and 'Philosophy and Food', and can be 
defined as fo Hows: 
a) Foodist Philosophy is a style of philosophy that assumes that our food and eating 
practices are fundamental aspects ofthe human condition. Curtin and Heldke (1992: xiv) 
argue that "thinking through food philosophically" will show how "the basic projects of 
Western philosophical tradition have been skewed". Philosophy has tended to value 
questions about the "abstract and mental" more than questions about "embodied, 
concrete, practical experience". Following Curtin and Heldke's (1992: xiv) lead, I aim to 
justify new categories of inquiry and also to "provide further illumination of traditional 
philosophical problems". Foodist Philosophy needs to be understood in the same way that 
Feminist Philosophy is understood, that is, as a style of philosophy that approaches 
philosophical problems from a certain perspective. 
b) Philosophy of Food is the category in which one could either undertake a 
conceptual study of food and all the human practices that surround it or one could offer a 
normative theory about what humans ought to be doing when they grow, prepare and 
consume food. Brillat-Savarin (1970) was one of the first philosophers to attempt to offer 
a normative theory on what and how humans ought to be eating. The sorts of questions 
that would be considered in this category are: 
l. What is food and what is the scope of the concept? Are there necessary and 
sufficient conditions for its application? Is it a functional concept? 
2. What are the norms of eating? For example, what may be eaten, what tastes good 
or bad, what is the correct conduct associated with eating? What are the goals of 
eating, is it just bodily nourishment or pleasure or sociality or all three and 
possibly other things? 
5 
.1 , .__ ..• .• 
3. What is the nature of these norms? For example, what is a gustatory judgement 
and does it differ from an aesthetic judgement? . 
. This category contains philosophical questions that are uniquely concerned with food 
c) Philosophy and Food is the category that takes various philosophical theories and 
attempts to apply them to food. The purpose of this category is to better understand the 
philosophical theory, to test the scope of the theory through an application to food, and to 
gain insight into food itself. Elizabeth Telfer's (1996) Foodfor Thought: Philosophy and 
Food is an excellent example of work in this category. Telfer analyses philosophical 
theories about the nature of rights, art, pleasure and even virtues - all through the lens of 
food. 
Although all the above categories are worthy of philosophical exploration, I have 
chosen to focus on and develop the first category, because Foodist Philosophy is the 
most original of the three and hence has had the least philosophical attention. 
1.6 Outline of Thesis Chapters 
In my second chapter I discuss Foodist Philosophy and begin by examining the 
differences between a style and area of philosophy, because an essential feature of 
Foodist Philosophy is that it is a style of philosophy. Areas of philosophy are constituted 
by the subject matter whereas styles of philosophy involve the process of handling, or 
approach to that subject matter. A foodist, that is someone who advocates foodist 
philosophy, starts with the significance of the fact that all humans eat, and believes that 
all things are interconnected, none self-sufficient, and advocates the idea of participatory 
relations between humans. A foodist values the body, an ethic of care and generosity, and 
values virtues such as hospitality and moderation. The second chapter will offer an 
explanation and defence of these claims. 
I then attempt to show how this style of philosophy can be used to critique and reread 
another philosophical work. I use Plato's Symposium as an example, not only because 
Plato was one of the first philosophers to denigrate eating but also because his play is set, 
unexpectedly, in distinctively foodist surroundings: a banquet or drinks party. The third 
chapter gives an overview of the Symposium and I discuss the interpretative accounts of 
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Ferrari (1992), Kahn (1996), Nussbaum (1986), Price (1989), Rutherford (1995), and 
Vlastos (1999). I argue that although these interpretations vary, we can conclude that the 
core of the dialogue is Socrates ' speech and that Plato's view oflove entails a spiritual 
ascent to the love of the Forms. 
In the fourth chapter I offer a foodist rereading of Plato's Symposium. I do this in two 
ways. First, one can accept for the sake of argument that Plato's view oflove entails love 
of the Forms and then, for foodist reasons, object to his account. Second one can argue 
that Plato's view of love is more complex than the above interpretation and argue that 
Plato's view oflove does allow for a foodist conception thereof. 
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Chapter 2 
What is Foodist Philosophy?' 
2.1 Chapter Introduction 
In the first chapter I discussed the history of the philosophical neglect of food and why 
philosophy should pay attention to food. I then briefly discussed three possible 
philosophical approaches to food. My tripartite division is Foodist Philosophy, 
Philosophy of Food and Philosophy and Food. In this chapter I develop an account of 
Foodist Philosophy. I begin by explaining the difference between a style of philosophy 
and an area of philosophy, and how foodism is an example of the former. I then develop 
a Foodist Manifesto, using ideas from Curtin (1992), Heldke (1992), Kass (1994), Nozick 
(1989), and Versveld (1983). 
2.2 Terms 
Initially I wanted to label this category 'Food Philosophy' but I realised that this term 
could be misleading. Food Philosophy implies personal philosophies such as 'my food 
philosophy is to live to eat and not eat to live' . Although personal food philosophies may 
be interesting, especially when they are the philosophies of famous chefs such as Nigella 
Lawson or Jamie Oliver, this is not what I want this category to cover because personal 
philosophies are not philosophically interest ing. 
My other two options are either 'Foodism,l or 'Foodist Philosophy'. I have modelled 
these names on Feminism and Feminist Philosophy because I intend the former to 
parallel the latter in many respects. I use Foodism and Foodist Philosophy 
interchangeably. 
1 Foodism has been used to suggest the contemporary food craze or food fetishism - this is not the meaning 
that I have in mind. 
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2.3 Style of Philosophy vs. Area of Philosophy 
A distinctive feature of this category is that it is a style of philosophy, in the same way 
,that African Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy, Continental Philosophy or Analytic 
Philosophy are styles of philosophy. A style of philosophy that becomes popular and 
widely used becomes entrenched as a tradition2. I do not want to discuss all these 
examples of styles or traditions of philosophy. I mention these examples merely to make 
a point. I contrast these styles of philosophy with areas of philosophy. Areas of 
philosophy include, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Ethics and Logic. I discuss Longino's 
(1999) account of feminist epistemology as an example of a style of philosophy, 
Areas of philosophy are the basic constituents of philosophy and represent the various 
subject matters of philosophy, Metaphysics, Epistemology and Ethics are the three main 
philosophical areas, and Logic is another area of philosophy, although it is of a different 
kind. Blackburn (2004: xv) discusses philosophy's "truth-seeking aspirations", which he 
argues is essential to the identity of philosophy. Philosophy's "business of seeking the 
truth" is fundamentally concerned with four general questions, each belonging to a 
specific area: 
I.What is there in the most general sense? (Metaphysics) 
2. What can we know and how? (Epistemology) 
3. How should we conduct our lives? (Ethics) 
4. What are the most general conditions that must be satisfied by any coherent 
thought? (Logic) 
These general areas of philosophy are subdivided into other areas of philosophy. 
Although these four questions are the most general questions in philosophy, it is common 
for a philosopher to ask more focussed and particular questions. Other examples of 
philosophical subject areas include Aesthetics, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of 
Science, Political Philosophy and even Philosophy of Food. Hence, areas of philosophy 
are concerned with the subject matter of philosophy and should answer the question: 
"what is this philosophy about?" 
If areas of philosophy offer the content of the philosophy, then styles of philosophy 
offer ways in which that content is handled, Styles of philosophy answer the question: 
2 In order for a philosophical discourse to be a tradition. a necessary but not sufficient feature is that it is a 
style of philosophy, 
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"how is the philosophical question treated?" and are attempts to answer in unique ways 
the questions that the areas of philosophy have set up _ Styles of philosophy take different 
approaches, or perspectives, in order to rethink old conclusions and philosophical 
positions. 
Another way to understand this distinction between style and area is that the areas set 
up the parameters for the possible "truth" and styles are different angles or perspectives 
that aim at discovering the "truth". Each style offers a different perspective on 
metaphysical, ethical and epistemological questions. Logic is perhaps the one area in 
philosophy that remains constant and does not vary as the style changes. This is why I 
stated earlier that although logic is an area of philosophy, it is a special kind of an area. 
Each style or tradition has a different way of approaching these areas of philosophy 
and may arrive at very different conclusions because the style determines what issues and 
problems are to be emphasised. A style of philosophy places certain concerns and issues 
at its centre and privileges certain positions that may be ignored by other styles. Although 
styles of philosophy can be loosely categorised, many are interrelated and their 
boundaries may overlap. Hence, although the distinction between style and area may be 
clear, the divisions between different styles may be quite permeable. For example, 
African Philosophy, a style of Philosophy, has both Analytic and Continental styles of 
writing within its body of work. 
In Neil Levy's (2003) paper "Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Explaining the 
Differences", he argues that attempts to capture the differences between these two styles 
(analytic and continental philosophy) have been inadequate because they have not offered 
explanations of these differences. Levy argues that analytic philosophy should be seen as 
philosophy conducted within a paradigm (in the Kuhnian sense) whereas continental 
philosophy shares much less in the way of presuppositions, problems and approaches. 
Levy considers seven suggestions that attempt to characterise the differences and he 
shows how each suggestion is problematic. Although Levy's main argument is interesting 
10 
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and provocative, it is problematic) and hence shows how difficult it is to characterise 
different styles of philosophy. 
Before I discuss an example of a style of philosophy in more detail, I offer a food 
analogy in order to clarify the distinction between areas and styles of philosophy. Food 
needs to be understood in the same way as the umbrella term 'philosophy'. Just as 
philosophy is subdivided into different areas, food is also subdivided into different food 
groups. Different areas of food include proteins, carbohydrates, fruit, vegetables, fats, and 
proteins, and can be further subdivided into chicken, beef, eggs, chickpeas and so on. 
There are many ways of preparing or eating food and the different ways of handling the 
food can be thought of as different approaches to the food. Frying, roasting, boiling, and 
blending are some ofthe ways food is treated. For example there could also be a 'raw 
food style' that advocates eating raw food such as sashimi, salad, or carpaccio. Another 
style could be roasting food, for example roasted chicken or roasted vegetables. Each 
style of handling the food has different assumptions about the best way to treat and 
consume a particular food group. The style will determine the outcome of the final 
product, which can vary considerably: compare a fried egg to a boiled egg. Some styles 
are better suited to certain food groups and hence certain styles foreground certain food 
groups - for example meat is better roasted than boiled. The different styles also bring 
out different qualities and features of the food such as frying may allow the food to retain 
its colour whereas steaming food may result in the food retaining its healthy properties. 
From the above analogy it should be evident that areas are the content whereas styles 
constitute the way that the content is handled or treated. Clearly, certain styles are better 
suited for certain content, but each style will have its positive attributes. Each style has 
the ability to illuminate and bring out different features and qualities in the content. I now 
offer a detailed example of a style of philosophy, namely feminist epistemology. 
Helen Longino (1999) argues in "Feminist Epistemology", that feminist epistemology 
is not a certain doctrine of epistemology but rather a certain way of doing epistemology. 
She begins her account by stating that epistemology is a general inquiry into the meaning 
l Levy accounts for the difference between analytic and continental philosophy by arguing that the former 
needs to be understood as an ongoing research program whereas the latter is not. He offers interesting but 
contestable points in favour of his argument. J shall not discuss his paper further, as this is really a 
tangential point. 
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of knowledge claims, conditions for the possibility of knowledge and the natureof truth 
and justification. Longino emphasises that although one oftli.e aims offeminist 
epistemology is to be critical of mainstream western philosophy, she does not aim to give 
up entirely on all of philosophy's constraints and aspirations. She aims is to find new 
directions but with old tools. 
Feminist epistemology in Longino's account, is not concerned with reconceptualising 
the entire area of epistemology, but rather to rethink various attitudes and concepts that 
are "tainted with masculinism" (Longino 1999: 330). Longino states that the feminist 
epistemological enquiry is concerned with how concepts of truth, rationality, objectivity 
and certainty can be "rethought" but not thrown out, in order to rid this area 
(epistemology) of its gender bias. Longino states that it is not the entire area of 
epistemology that is at fault, but rather certain attitudes and concepts within it. The role 
of feminist epistemology, according to Longino, is to sort through epistemological 
concepts in order to see what should be retained, transformed or jettisoned in the area of 
epistemology. 
Longino (1999: 331) argues that feminist epistemology is "like the rest of 
philosophy". She offers a brief account of what is generally assumed to be philosophical 
methodology. Particular topics are taken up, understood from different angles and then 
contested. From this, certain problems and issues emerge as central and certain 
theoretical fom1ll1ations are examined, and used or discarded. Longino points out that 
there is "no single feminist epistemology" and there exist many approaches, ideas and 
arguments. The common link is the philosophers' agenda to expose and reverse the 
gender bias in the former, traditional formulations. 
This approach rejects the traditional Cartesian understanding of epistemology and 
instead insists on a conception of the knower as embodied. Longino argues that this 
insistence on embodiment leads to several consequences : knowers must be understood as 
situated in specific contexts, the knowing subject and object can no longer be conceived 
as distinct, and knowers also need to be understood as being in various relationships of 
interdependence with other knowers. These consequences will have a converse influence 
on how we understand epistemic justification. 
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Longino argues that feminist epistemology is important because it has placec\ certain 
questions -largely neglected in recent analytic epistemology- on the agenda of 
contemporary philosophy. For example, given the Cartesian legacy (the identification of 
knowledge with certainty) that is so entrenched in the area of epistemology, historically, 
philosophers have focussed their attention on skepticism and its refutation. However, 
through an affirmation of embodiment, feminists have drawn attention to a variety of 
epistemological issues other than the refutation of skepticism. 
An example of an issue that has been fore grounded is epistemic justification. If 
knowing subjects are embodied, then it follows that knowers are situated and there are 
relations of interdependence between them. A consequence ofthis view is that there can 
be "no place oftranscendence" or "unsituatedness" for which epistemic privilege can be 
claimed (Longino 1999: 332). This means that all beliefs will be influenced and mediated 
by the features of the situations in which they are formed. This has lead many feminist 
theorists to reject the strategy of epistemic privileging and to rethink alternative 
approaches to justification. Longino (1999: 333) discusses three possible responses to the 
situatedness of subjects although the most radical move is known as "socialising or 
contextualisingjustification". This is an alternative to foundationalist and coherentist 
theories ofjustification4 . 
It is clear that Longino is a 'reformist' feminist philosopher rather than a 'radical' 
feminist philosopher. The former refers to feminists who aim at rereading and 
reconceptualising concepts in philosophy rather than rejecting the whole project of 
Western philosophy. It should be noted that Feminist philosophy is often critiqued and 
rejected because its opponents claim that it lacks a coherent project. In the "Feminist 
History of Philosophy" (http://plato.standford.edu/entries/feminism-feministl), Gosselin 
states that it is "perplexing" how some feminist philosophers hail Nietzsche as a 
supporter of feminist issues, while others claim he is a misogynist. Not only have 
feminist philosophers reached different interpretations of the history of philosophy but 
many of these interpretations conflict. This ambivalence regarding feminist 
interpretations of canonical philosophers and the history of philosophy raises questions 
~ More specifically, contextualism is the alternative to foundationalism and coherentism as descriptive 
theories, socialism is the alternative to foundationalism and coherentism as normative theories, 
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about the coherence and unity of the feminist project. Many argue that this lack.of 
coherence or unity undermines feminist philosophy as a style of philosophy. I argue that 
this view is incorrect because one of the main features of the notion ofa 'style of 
philosophy' is that it is difficult to define and pinpoint the boundaries and positions of 
each style. 
Stroud (2001: 32-33) argues that philosophy is an activity and not a set of doctrines or 
truths as there can be no "philosophical creed". He also argues that the aim or goal of 
philosophy should not be to discover any philosophical creeds or doctrines. He describes 
philosophy as "making no progress" because philosophers agree on very little. He points 
out that unlike science, philosophy has no "body or a doctrine that can be called truths 
[like those] of physics or chemistry". Ifphilosophers do agree on something, this does not 
mean that they have discovered "philosophical facts or truths" but rather have simply 
attained "widespread agreement". For Stroud (2001: 34), it is the philosophical "works" 
and not their "results" that constitute a tradition of philosophy. Unlike the enterprise of 
science that is defined according to its results, philosophy is defined and categorised 
according to its "interests and approaches and procedures". 
Longino and Stroud suggest that we must not understand styles of philosophy as 
categories that contain a unified set of truths that are related and coherent. That feminist 
philosophy has conflicting approaches and contrasting positions does not undermine it as 
a style of philosophy. That there are many internal debates within these various styles of 
philosophy is a healthy condition and reinforces the project of philosophy as being an 
activity rather than a creed. 
Stroud (2001: 41-42) uses an analogy from Wittgenstein to describe the active nature 
ofphilosophy: "the philosopher treats a question; as an illness is treated". For Stroud, the 
stress is on the verb. Treating a question is different to answering a question. Treatment 
involves identification and understanding of the origins and causes ofthe disease. Just as 
different health practitioners use different approaches to treating an illness, so too, do 
philosophers of different styles use different approaches and methods in treating a 
question. Stroud argues that in philosophy, "we need to identify the assumptions, the 
demands, the preconceptions, and the aspirations that lead to a question'S having the 
particular significance it now has for us". For Stroud, philosophy is inseparable from the 
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history of philosophy because "philosophy is always in part a response to a preyious 
philosophy". Each new style of philosophy is a response to previous, more dominant 
styles of philosophy. 
A potential objection to this concept of a style of philosophy, is that given that styles 
may lack unity and coherence, how does a philosopher identify and differentiate between 
different styles? I think that this objection focuses on the difficulty in defining and 
categorising styles of philosophy given their fluid boundaries and varying projects. 
Earlier on I stated that I was not going to attempt to define different styles, as there are 
many debates about what constitutes (for example) African Philosophy or Continental 
Philosophy. However, if one were to attempt to define a style of philosophy where 
would one begin? I think that all styles have basic assumptions and approach 
philosophical areas from a particular angle or framework. For example, Longino argues 
that feminist philosophers all presuppose that human beings are embodied beings and that 
this embodiment has various implications. Not only do styles contain various 
assumptions, but it appears that styles seem to have certain agendas too. 
Longino's paper shows how feminist epistemology is united by its common (political) 
agenda. For ideas, concepts or arguments to be labelled as part of the "feminist 
epistemological" style, the epistemologists must have an agenda that involves resisting 
the gender bias that exists in the area of epistemology. While it may not be immediately 
evident that all styles have agendas, on closer examination, they do indeed involve 
particular assumptions about their projects. 
As I have already noted, each style carries variolls assllmptions. These basic 
assumptions inevitably inform particular agendas and projects. Not all agendas are as 
explicit as the agenda of feminist epistemology. Marxism critiques philosophical 
concepts and theories that serve the interests of the ruling classes against the exploited 
classes. Foucaultian styles of philosophy critique traditional concepts of power and 
challenge 'normalised' concepts that essentially act as oppressive devices. Nietzschean 
philosophy aims to ' overcome' the Christian-Platonic tradition by embracing 
perspectivism. Even Analytic Philosophy, whose supporters claim that it is neutral, 
objective and value-free, has hidden agendas. 
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An objection to my claim - that all styles of philosophy have agendas - could be that 
1 have used the word 'agenda' loosely and its meaning has shifted depending on the style 
·1 am discussing. However, 1 believe that it is not the meaning, but the visibility of the 
agenda that shifts . Although certain agendas are strongly political and explicit, as in the 
case of Feminist Philosophy, other styles may have implicit, and less obvious agendas, as 
in the case of Analytic Philosophy. It follows, then, that one of the functions of styles of 
philosophy, is to uncover and critique these various agendas, explicit or implicit. 
Not only would some Analytic philosophers deny that there is an inherent agenda in 
the tradition of Analytic philosophy but more importantly "Analytic Philosophy" is not a 
style. For many "ultra-faithfuls"s, analytic philosophy is the only legitimate form of 
philosophy, and the concept of "styles of phi losophy" is redundant. 
One reason for thi s attitude is that analytic philosophy models itself on mathematical 
and logical methodology. As noted above,logic is the one area of phi losophy not 
susceptible to shifts in style. Laws oflogic are universal and hence do not change even if 
the context does . For this reason, many analytic philosophers believe that philosophy 
should be universal i.e. that it is possible to do it from your armchair and that it cannot be 
qualified by modifiers such as African. Therefore, for many analytics, African 
Philosophy is not considered philosophy (Eze 2001 : 206). 
Eze (2001) argues that African Philosophy is indeed a legitimate style of philosophy 
because African issues are human issues and therefore universal. Eze (2001 : 212-213) 
defines African Philosophy as "a body of reflections, texts, institutions, and professional 
societies committed to easily historico-politcal agendas". He makes the further claim that 
Analytic philosophy merely "pretend[ s 1 that it is itself ahistorical and apolitical". 
1 agree with Eze that Analytic philosophy does indeed have certain agendas (although 
perhaps not explicit ones) and that it is indeed one of many styles of philosophy. Analytic 
philosophy makes certain assumptions and privileges logical and mathematical 
methodology. These assumptions inevitably inform the approach of analytic philosophy 
and the sorts of areas and issues that are addressed. The assumption that logic is the best 
methodology creates certain agendas. 
, Eze (2001) uses the term "ultra-faithful" to describe proponents of analytic philosophy who believe that 
"the history of philosophy is really the history of analytic philosophy". Ultra-faithfuls are those who 
believe that there is only one, universal discipline of philosophy i.e. analytic philosophy. 
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The difficulty that Analytic philosophy has in addressing certain areas of philosophy 
also indicates that it is a philosophical style. The following statement by Danto (although 
.slightly modified by an anonymous source) makes this point quite clear: "how 
incorrigibly stiff analytic philosophy is when it undertakes to lay its icy fingers on the 
frilled and beating wings of the butterfly oflove". In my opinion, subject matter like the 
human condition, emotions, love and so on are often better handled by traditions such as 
Continental philosophy, whereas Analytic philosophy is more appropriate for 
approaching subjects related to philosophy of language or epistemology. 
To summarise: there are certain features that different styles of philosophy have in 
common. First, each style has a different way of approaching, handling or treating the 
various areas of philosophy. Some styles are better suited to particular areas. A style of 
philosophy is a way of doing philosophy. Given the various treatments of philosophical 
questions, each style will generate unique solutions or conclusions to philosophical 
problems. It is difficult to characterise a style of philosophy because within each style 
there are divergences and differentiations. Styles of philosophy are constantly changing. 
Each style has what I have termed an agenda, which may be explicit or implicit. This 
agenda critiques other styles of philosophy, usually more dominant or mainstream ones. 
Given these general features of styles of philosophy, the stylistic nature of foodist 
philosophy should be apparent. It is a way of doing philosophy and approaches 
philosophical questions from a particular foodist perspective. Foodism has an agenda - to 
assert value on the activity of eating and hence to foreground the role of the body. I now 
offer an account of Foodism. 
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2.4 Foodist Manifesto 
a) Structure offoodist account 
First steps: 
I. Focus on the ordinary as opposed to the extraordinary (Nozick) 
2. Eating as the ordinary AND tied to human nature (Kass) 
Incorrect steps: 
Total rejection 
a) Everything is food (Zen's Radical Foodism) 
b) Everything is a process (Heraclitus' Flux-Foodism) 
Next step: 
Develop a Foodist Metaphysics, Epistemology and Ethics (Kass, Curtin, Heldke 
and Versveld) 
b) Noting the Ordinary 
The first move a foodist needs to make is it to focus on the ordinary as opposed to the 
extraordinary. In his Examined Life, Nozick (1989) argues that the most ordinary objects 
can yield surprises to attentive awareness. He uses the examples of human activities 
associated with food and air. Although eating and breathing are part of life's ordinary 
necessities, when we actually attend to them we realise that through eating and breathing 
we can have a "profound experience of nons epa ration from the rest of existence" (Nozick 
1989: 58). 
Through eating we form a very intimate relationship with external reality. When we 
eat, we literally consume the outside world and incorporate it into our bodies. In this way 
the world enters us and essentially becomes us. Another feature of eating is that it 
represents our essential mode of sociability, especially as we often eat with others. 
However, eating also has an individual non-social aspect. When we eat, we open 
ourselves to the food and hence get to know its essence in a very intimate way and then 
allow it to be incorporated into our own flesh. 
Nozick's point is that even life's necessary banalities such as eating and breathing, can 
offer profound insights if we attend to them. By "attending", Nozick means 
contemplating these phenomena in a philosophical way. Philosophy tends to ignore these 
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'trivial matters' in favour of 'higher' ones exclusively associated with the rationality of 
human beings: thinking and believing. 
Curtin (1992: 3) makes a stronger claim than Nozick: while Nozick advocates 
consideration of the ordinary, Curtin argues that there are "deep structural reasons" why 
traditional philosophy has neglected discussion of the ordinary. Traditional philosophy 
tends to value subjects that are public, masculine, and universal. The ordinary aspects of 
our lives such as eating and breathing can only be understood as concrete and embodied. 
For this reason, Curtin argues that traditional Western philosophy has been uninterested 
in common everyday experiences that "add spice to life". Traditionally the focus has been 
on the aspects of life that can be ordered by theory making, i.e. the "reduction of 
temporal events to abstract, disembodied, atemporal schemata" (Curtin 1992: 3). Curtin 
(\992: 3) quotes Nietzsche who was one of the first philosophers to acknowledge the 
philosophical neglect of the ordinary: 
Somethingfor the indllstriol/s .. . So far, everything that has given colour to 
existence still lacks a history: or, where could one find a history of love, of 
avarice, of envy, of conscience, of piety, or of cruelty? .. Does anyone know the 
moral effects of food? Is there a philosophy of nourishment? (The ever-renewed 
clamour for and against vegetarianism is sufficient proof that there is no such 
philosophy as yet). 
Therefore the first move a foodist should make is to revalue objects and activities that are 
physical, transitory and ordinary. A foodist would claim that food and eating, although 
ordinary, are worthy of philosophical attention. 
c) Eating Reveals Human Nature 
An immediate response to the foodist's focus on the ordinary is the question: "what 
counts as the ordinary?" Does this mean that philosophy can be about everything and 
anything? There are many objects from doorknobs to trees that we could describe as 
'ordinary'. Would a foodist claim that we ought to contemplate all these objects in a 
philosophical way? The foodist, therefore, needs to qualify which ordinary objects are 
worthy of philosophical inquiry. 
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Objects and activities that reveal insights into human nature are the sort of 'ordinary' 
things that philosophy should focus on. In the following section, I describe an argument 
by Kass (1994) for eating as an ordinary activity closely linked to human nature. 
Kass is the quintessential foodist because he uses the common phenomena of eating as 
a starting point, or "evidence" in his search for what is "universally, permanently and 
profoundly true about the human animal and its deepest hungerings" (Kass 1994: xi). In 
The Hungry Soul: Eating and the Perfecting of our Nature, Kass argues that there is a 
deep connection between human eating, human freedom and human moral self-
consciousness. 
Kass' (1994) project aims to show how both modem corporealists (those who deny or 
deprecate the soul) and their opponents, modem rationalists (those who deny or deprecate 
the body), are both mistaken about living nature and about humans. It is through an 
examination of eating that Kass (1994: 9) argues for a view of nature that sees humans as 
"psychophysical unities who are enlivened, purposive, and open to and in converse with 
the larger world". 
Kass (1994: 11) argues that not only is eating an interesting topic in its own right but 
that it is eating that is the "perfect subject" for reopening the question about nature, 
human nature and ethics. Kass (1994: 11-12) argues: 
1. Every animal eats. 
2. Animals mostly eat other living things or their products; and eating necessarily 
implies and illuminates the relations between living beings. Thinking about eating 
also implies thinking about relations between animal's nature and the larger world 
- i.e. nature as a whole. 
3. Understanding human nature also expresses the relation between the nonrational 
and rational in humans and between the natural and cultural or ethical. 
4. Nature, correctly understood, may offer insights into the framework of the good 
and virtuous life. 
Kass (1994: 14) describes his argument as an "ascent" from nature to human nature 
through justice, nobility, and holiness. 
Kass (1994: 83) cites Rousseau, who emphasised the correlation between human 
freedom and human appetite. Human difference is demonstrable in diet. Animals are 
driven by instinct to select the correct foods whereas humans choose food and its amount 
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using their will. The human appetite is distinctly flexible and this is reflected in human 
omnivorousness. 
Kass (1994: 91) further discusses how the "openness of human taste" allows for the 
distinction between what is pleasant and what is nourishing for the human being. That 
humans have been partially emancipated from instinct means that we have 
simultaneously acquired both the need and the capacity to concern ourselves with 
questions of what is good and bad. For Kass (1994: 91), the human "uninstructed appetite 
for food" illustrates that humans are by nature "ethical animals" in that we know that 
there is a good and a bad between which we need to choose. 
It follows that humans are the only species who have norms governing their eating 
practices. Kass (1994: 131) states that the manner of eating, more than what is eaten 
reflects the "humanity of the eaters". We are the only animal species that is self-
conscious of what and how we eat. It is therefore evident that although eating may be a 
banal everyday necessity, it is a human practice that expresses our human nature. 
TIu'ough the lens of eating we are able to see more clearly the various facets of the human 
condition. Eating forces us to acknowledge our bodily existence, including our drives and 
desires. Eating also illuminates the distinction between us and other animals in that it 
reflects our rationality, self-consciousness and freedom. Most importantly, eating is a 
human practice that clearly captures the necessary ethical aspects of our nature. 
Therefore, eating represents the uniqueness of the human condition - it reminds us that 
we are embodied, rational beings who are necessarily ethical. 
d) A Brief Classification of Foodism 
Foodism is a style of philosophy that attempts to make an everyday activity - eating - the 
focus or starting point of philosophical enquiry. Foodism asserts that eating is a 
significant part of being human and that the practice of eating must be foregrounded, not 
ignored, if we are to understand the human condition and the world in which we live. A 
foodist's motivation for foregrounding eating is that eating is a universal human activity 
that represents the ambivalent aspects of human nature. 
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On the one hand, we are animals who are slaves to our hunger drives, while at the 
same time our eating reflects our rationality as it is a symbolic and meaningful activity 
for us . Although we are like animals in that we have to eat in order to live, we eat rather 
than merely feed. It follows that Foodism involves the discussion of philosophical 
concerns that refuse to identify the human experience exclusively with disembodied 
rationality. 
Writing from various perspectives, a foodist challenges several areas of traditional 
philosophy on the grounds that it fails: 
1. To take seriously the practice of human eating and the implications that this 
universal activity generates, and 
2. To recognise an eater's (that is an embodied) way of being, thinking and doing 
are as valuable as contemplation of abstracts. 
Foodist philosophers fault traditional metaphysics for splitting the self from the other and 
the mind from the body, for wondering whether 'other minds' exist and whether personal 
identity depends more on memories than on physical characteristics. Foodism rejects all 
forms of ontological dualism. Rather it stresses the ways in which individuals are 
psychophysical embodied beings, who are defined by their relations to other embodied 
beings and to their relations with the world. Foodists value the body as much as human 
rationality, whereas traditional philosophers tend to privilege the rational and abstract 
above the embodied and concrete. 
Foodism also critiques traditional ethics for its basis in rules and principles. 
Traditional ethics involve maximising utility for the aggregate or doing duty for duty's 
sake, and hence measure human conduct against a set of universal, abstract, impersonal 
norms. This view of ethics has been labelled a justice perspective of ethics. A foodist on 
the other hand, would promote what is commonly known as a care perspective of ethics 
and stresses responsibilities and relationships rather than rights and rules. A foodist 
attends more to the particular features of each moral situation than to its general 
implications. 
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e) Two Extreme Types of Foodism 
Before I present a positive foodist account, I will discuss two hypothetical cases of 
foodism that ought to be rejected. Zen-Foodism and Flux-Foodism are extreme forms of 
foodism that claim that everything is food or everything is a process respectively. These 
examples of foodism advocate positions that are too far removed from traditional 
philosophy to enter into dialogue and therefore cannot be useful as a critique of 
traditional Western philosophy. 
Zen-Foodists are radical foodists who will support any view that is associated with 
food. Radical foodists would reject Western philosophy in its entirety and embrace 
Eastern philosophy because of the central role food plays in Eastern metaphysics. 
Versveld (1983: 27) discusses the Taittiriya and Maitri Upanishads, where the ultimate 
reality is said to be food. Food is understood in a spiritual dimension and the food in us is 
one with 'The Food'. 
Food has a nourishing and sustaining quality for both biological life and thought and 
spirit, for example: 
From food, verily, creatures are produced, 
Whatsoever creatures dwell on the earth. 
Moreover by food, in truth they live. 
Moreover into it also they finally pass 
For truly food is the chief of all beings; 
Therefore it is called the essence of things. 
Verily, they obtain all food 
Who worship Brahma as food. 
For tndy, food is the chief of all beings, 
Therefore it is called the essence of all things . 
From food created things are born. 
By food, when born, do they grow up. 
It is both eaten and eats things. 
Because of that it is called food. 
(Taittiriya Upanishad 2.2) 
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This doctrine is similar to the Zen Buddhist doctrine found in the Vimalakirti Scripture: 
"when one is identified with the food one eats one is identified with the whole universe; 
when we are one with the whole universe we are one with the food we eat" (quoted in 
Curtin and Heldke 1992: 153). Radical foodists would therefore claim that the ultimate 
reality is food. 
Through a complete rejection of Western philosophy, Zen-Foodism has lost any 
common ground that would permit dialogue and critique between the two. Zen-Food ism 
and Western philosophy are mutually exclusive paradigms and this disables any 
meaningful communication. 
Flux-Foodism is another type of extreme foodism. Flux-Foodists use Heraclitus' 
theory of universal flux as a starting point for their views. Given that humans are in a 
constant need of sustenance - our need to eat is never sated - a flux-foodist denies the 
existence of anything that is constant or fixed. For a flux-foodist, the food we eat is in a 
continual process of change, and for them it follows that everything is in the process of 
becoming. The human condition, and more broadly, the world in which the human is 
situated, is marked by flux and change. A flux-foodist would quote Heraclitus: 
20. Everything flows and nothing abides; everything gives way and nothing stays 
fixed. 
21. You cannot step twice over the same river, for other waters are continually 
flowing on. 
22. Cool things become warm, the warm grows cool; the moist dies, the parched 
becomes moist. 
23. It is in changing that things find repose. 
(quoted in Wheelwright 1959: 29) 
Wheelwright (1959: 29) writes that the theme of "unceasing change" is a very old one 
in philosophy and that for many the notion that "everything changes" is merely only 
partially true. Although the physical world may be in constant flux, things like 
mathematical truths and laws of logic are constant and fixed. However, Heraclitus' 
response to this would be that "permanence is but a relative term" because what we 
would call permanent is simply an example of "change in slow motion or in hidden 
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guise" (Wheelwright 1959: 30). A flux-foodist would therefore advocate that everything 
a process. 
This view, however, is clearly mistaken when we consider that the laws of logic are 
examples of things that are fixed and constant. To hold such an extreme view - such as 
reality is a process - is to once again disable dialogue and critique between foodism and 
Western Philosophy. Although many foodists would not want to deny that there are many 
things that are processes - eating being a prime example - they would also assert that 
certain things are fixed and constant. That all living things require sustenance is an 
example of a physical law that is constant and unchanging. 
Hence, although a case can be made for extreme foodists, I believe that their style of 
philosophy would fail as an adequate tool to critique a text like Plato's Symposium. For 
this reason, I will now develop an account of Foodism that will not be so extreme as to 
disable dialogue between it and traditional Western Philosophy. My positive account of 
foodism will use ideas from Kass (1994), Curtin (1992), Heldke (1992), Telfer (1996) 
and Versveld (1983). 
f) A Foodist Metapbysics 
Kass (1994: 34) argues that most biologists and philosophical corporealists are firm 
believers in the "primacy of the material" and that the motto "you are what you eat" 
could well be theirs. However, he argues against this and in favour of the necessary 
supremacy of the living form. Material and form are relative and correlative terms: form 
is something made of certain materi als and materials are of and for the thing as formed. 
To be material means to be potential and to be able to receive a certain form. Marble is 
the material for the form that is a sculpture. Form and material are interdependent at 
multiple levels of organisation. At the lowest level of organisation is the ultimate material 
- matter. Kass (1994: 36) claims that corporeal science aims to explain all organisation in 
terms of this "ultimate matter". Form on their account would be at all levels an accident. 
This is the view that Kass is challenging. 
For Kass (1994: 36) form is often associated with shape and figure, yet the form of 
living beings is more than simply the aggregate of the living parts. Form is what makes a 
being a uniiy and a whole. Form provides specificity and identity. Although form is 
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immediately recognisable in the organism's surface appearance, Kass claims that there is 
more to form than its visibility. Living organisms are not only visibly ordered, but they 
.are also internally organised. 
Another observation that Kass (1994: 54) makes is what he refers to as "that great 
paradox of life" that he believes is evident in the necessity of eating. All living forms 
need to threaten other life forms in order to maintain their own life and form and eating is 
simultaneously form preserving and fonn destroying. From this claim, Kass infers that 
life is an advance over non-life and that living things have "more being" than non-living 
things. This is because living things are dependent on the world and participate in 
meaningful relationships with the world that transcend their own boundaries of here and 
now. 
Thus, we can make some inferences about nature through the examination of eating. 
First, we can divide the world into living and non-living things. Living things have to 
ingest external substances (other living things or nutrients or minerals) in order to 
maintain their form. All living things have similar material compositions, yet are distinct 
because of their form. The state of living things is constantly changing. Living things 
participate in relationships with the world, acting on the world and simultaneously being 
acted on by the world. 
Versveld (1983: 24) states that "an eaten world is an intelligible world" and it 
necessitates human perception and awareness that the "world as food is a humanised 
world". In the same way that it is logically impossible to have freedom without obstacles, 
Versveld believes that it is impossible to have the concept food without human existence. 
Versveld writes, "I may not be the bread of life, but I am the life of bread" and "when 
you eat bread, you are eating reality". 
Kass and Versveld are making similar claims. What makes the human species distinct 
from other living beings (besides their form) is an awareness of the necessity of not only 
acting on the external world, but the necessity of ingesting the external world to maintain 
the human fornl . 
Heldke (1992) offers an account of the participatory conception of self and how the 
moral agent is deeply connected to others in a complex pattern of defining relations. 
According to Heldke (1992: II), we have "participatory" and "objectified" relations to 
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food. An objectified relation to food implies an indirect, external and non-defining 
relation between the subject and the food in which food is objectified. Proponents of this 
.view are dualists who insist that the mind is autonomous and independent and food 
cannot define what it means to be a person. Heldke, Kass and Versveld reject this view 
and argue for what Heldke calls "participatory relations" to food. A foodist also asserts 
that not only do our participatory relations to food, but also to other humans and the 
world at large, define us. 
Heldke stipulates that a participatory relation is a "defining relation". A person cannot 
be described in terms of essential, internal and immutable qualities, but progressively 
becomes a person through "relational openness to others". This relational understanding 
of self leads to the view that we are partially defined by our relations to the food we eat. 
Heldke (1992: 12) makes two claims about the distinction between participatory and 
objectified relations, "one ontic and the other epistemic". Ontologically, she believes that 
humans are constituted as persons by the food that they eat and what they consider food. 
Epistemically, she claims that it is unhealthy to view ourselves as autonomous entities 
that only enter into non-defining relations. Heldke argues that to ignore that food is both 
physically and politically defining is to risk both physical and political health. 
Therefore a foodist would hold that living beings are in a constant state of becoming 
and are defined by their various participatory relations. Humans are embodied beings 
who are defined by many interdependent relationships. 
g) A Foodist Epistemology 
In a paper "Recipes for Theory Making", Heldke (1992) argues for a new understanding 
of epistemology. In order to develop a foodist epistemology, I have used many of her 
insights because not only does she use the example of cooking to substantiate her 
arguments but also her project -
inspired by feminist concerns - complements the foodist project. The next section is a 
summary ofHeldke's paper, with foodist parallels inserted. 
Heldke claims that traditional epistemology sets up dichotomies such as 
realism/antirealism and foundationalismlrelativism. Bernstein (cited by Heldke 1992: 
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252) claims that many epistemologists suffer from "Cartesian Anxiety". They believe that 
epistemology is a "bifurcated terrain" in which there is either a firm foundation for 
. knowledge (foundationalism) or there is an abyss of intellectual and moral indecision 
(relativism). Heldke (1992: 251) argues that there are alternative ways to engage in 
epistemology and that these dichotomies are not exhaustive: she refers to her approach to 
epistemology as the "Coresponsible Option". 
The term "coresponsible" refers to the "atmosphere of cooperation and interaction 
which characterises inquiry activity" (Heldke 1992: 253). When we engage in enquiry we 
enter into relationships with other enquirers and with the things6 about which we are 
inquiring. This option rejects the strict subject/object dichotomy and its implications of 
hierarchy and separation and that we should rather think of inquiry as a communal 
activity in which the relationships between the inquirers and inquired are emphasised. 
Heldke (1992: 253) quotes Dewey who claimed that inquiry is "the correspondence of 
two people who 'correspond' in order to modify one's own ideas, intents and acts". The 
term "option" suggests that there are many ways to think about the world and inquiry. 
Theories are merely tools we choose to use and outlooks that we decide to assume. Some 
theories may be more useful than others but none are universally reliable. 
Heldke' s motivation for developing the Coresponsible Option is her feminist agenda. 
She wants to develop ways to approach feminist inquiry that are respectful and 
illuminating of women's issues without slipping into the uncomfortable space of 
acknowledging all positions just because they represent a different perspective. Heldke 
(1992: 252) emphasises that her belief in the "respect for difference" should not be 
translated into the acceptance of misogynist, racist, classist or any oppressive views. She 
claims that foundational ism and relativism are inadequate frameworks for this sort of 
inquiry. Foundationalism simply treats difference as a stage that must be overcome in 
order to construct an adequate theory. Foundationalists consider difference a weakness or 
inadequacy in a theory. Although relativism allows and welcomes difference, it does not 
allow for any critique of these differences. Heldke's solution to the inadequacy of both 
foundationalism and relativism is the Coresponsible Option. 
, In traditional accounts these things about which we enquire are called the objects of our inquiry. 
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There could also be foodist motivations for why the Coresponsible Option is an 
attractive alternative to the. absolutistlrelativist dichotomy. A foodist's basic assumption 
js that all humans eat. However just as one cannot make universal claims about all 
women, one cannot make universal claims about how all humans eat. We also cannot 
claim that there is only one way of eating - some people use utensils, others their hands, 
some eat meat, others eat insects, some eat anything and everything. However, just as we 
need a theory to account for all these differences in eating, we also want to make some 
claims about better ways of eating or what constitutes healthier foodstuffs. We would 
also want to make claims like cannibalism is wrong or that eating in moderation is 
preferable to gluttony. 
Another aspect of eating that makes it difficult to constrict into the absolutist/relativist 
dichotomy is that although eating is a necessary universal practice; it is also a highly 
individualistic activity. Although we all have to eat, the matters of how, when and what 
we eat differs greatly in every individual. The act of eating also involves intimate 
knowledge between the eater and the food . Eating is perhaps the most thorough and 
intimate way of getting to know another object. When I eat, it is possible to use all five 
senses in the process. I see the food, I smell the food, sometimes I can hear the food 
cooking or whilst I chew it in my mouth, I touch the food with my hands and then tongue 
and finally I taste the food. Not only can I use every sense to get to know a foodstuff, but 
I eventually assimilate the food into my system and make it part of me. Hence, eating 
reveals the relationships that form between an inquirer and the inquired. For these 
reasons, foodists would find Heldke's Coresponsible Option appealing and relevant to 
their projects. 
Heldke situates a discussion of cooking within the context ofrejecting this 
absolutist/relativist dichotomy. She uses cooking7 to show that it is possible to think 
about inquiry and theorising in a ways that avoid the absolutist/relativist dichotomy. 
Heldke (1993: 254) believes that activities that fall under the category of "cooking" 
manifest qualities that should appear in the activity of philosophising. She believes that 
cooking is a kind of enquiry, and quotes Dewey's definition of inquiry as "the controlled 
7 Heldke (1992: 255) explains that she does not use cooking simply as an analogy to, or a metaphor for, 
philosophical and scientific inquiry. She cOllsiders cooking qua inquiry. 
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or directed transfonnation of an indetenninate situation into one that is so detenninate in 
its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements ofthe original 
~ituation into a unified whole" (Heldke 1992: 254). This definition is applicable to 
cooking because cooking challenges the strict dichotomy between theory and practice. 
Dewey argued that these are not separate areas of human life but rather two interrelated, 
interdependent domains. The difference between theory and practice is one of degree and 
not kind. 
HeJdke offers an account of a philosophical investigation into cooking with the aim of 
exploring possible ways of engaging in philosophical theory. She focuses her analysis of 
cooking on aspects of recipes and recipe-cook relationships and how each aspect can 
offer insights into philosophical theorising. 
First, Heldke argues that when we think about how and why recipes are created, we 
cannot make any essentialist claims. Cooks create recipes for a variety of reasons - some 
enter competitions, others out of economic necessity, and some for fun. Sometimes the 
aim of recipes is not even to produce food - Heldke mentions an example of people who 
create recipes for competitions that they have yet to literally tryout. Similarly, there is no 
one reason why people come up with different theories. It follows that theories, like 
recipes, need to be considered as tools that we use to help us do things. 
Many people do not use recipes when they cook, or they experiment in the kitchen and 
this often has beneficial results. Experimentation can be useful and rewarding because it 
can lead to wonderful new taste sensations or it can result in a feast, in spite of a 
relatively empty refrigerator. Similarly, Heldke argues that it is beneficial to explore and 
experiment with new theories. People who exclusively advocate one theory run the risk 
of being irrelevant, hannful or destructive. Failure to experiment with cooking may result 
in a boring diet, whereas failure to experiment in theorising may lead to an "arrogant, 
unperceptive inquirer" (Heldke 1992: 258). On a similar point, Versveld (1983: 17) states 
that his principle in teaching philosophy is that his students must not merely "regurgitate" 
his soup but rather "concoct" their own. Versveld claims that to "concoct" is the right 
word because it is difficult to offer recipes for soups, as they often tend to be an "omnium 
gatherum of what's at hand". 
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Second, Heldke (1992: 258) considers how we collect, store and swap recipes in the 
same way that we collect, trade and develop philosophical theories and that when she 
.thinks about theorising, she sees herself writing an "epistemological cookbook". This 
"epistemological cookbook" contains many ways to think about a large variety of issues 
and is arranged in a systematic order that serves her needs and would not necessarily be 
useful to anyone else. Her point is that theories, like recipes are tools that we can use 
depending on the situation. It is misguided to think that one recipe or theory will be 
sufficient or reliable or that only one system of theory organisation could be useful. 
Third, Heldke argues that thinking about how we use recipes shows us how we can 
avoid the absolutist/relativist dichotomy in our theorising. A recipe is a description or 
explanation of how to do something - specifically, how to prepare a particular kind of 
food. A recipe is one approach to preparing a certain dish - not the approach (the opinion 
of some cooks notwithstanding). Also a recipe does not suggest that this is th e food to eat 
(the opinion of some eaters notwithstanding). Heldke suggests that we should think of 
theori es in this light - as developing and exchanging them with friends and she labels this 
approach as the "recipe plan" for theorising (Heldke 1992: 259). 
On this "recipe plan" the theoriser does not assert that others must take up her project. 
She does not set absolutist agenda that the other theorist must work on. Rather, the 
theoriser presents issues that she finds important, suggest reasons why others should 
agree, and then suggests a methodology for approaching the issue. Heldke (1992 : 259) 
claims that philosophical theories created on this recipe plan will be formulated as an 
if/then statement, that is "if you find this project compelling, then you might find this 
approach useful". For example, you can ask a friend if they like strawberries because they 
are in season and inexpensive. You can then offer them your fabulous recipe for a 
strawberry dessert. For Heldke, this way of thinking about theorizing, and about how to 
offer theories to others, avoids absolutism. However, she also argues that this recipe plan 
avoids relativism too. 
Although, theorists may select problems at random and then proceed to use the 
methodology they deem most appropriate, Heldke believes that relativism is avoidable. 
Recipes allow cooks to fiddle with the ingredient list and vary their preparation 
techniques'. Some recipes are considerably more flexible than others, although most of 
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them will have their breaking point. If I make too many changes, my product may not 
have the intended outcome. Hence changing the ingredients "or preparation methods may 
!lot only destroy the integrity of the final product, it may also result in an inedible stuff. A 
recipe plan is not relativist because once you decide to cook something - take on a certain 
philosophical problem - some methods of proceeding will be closed to you because of 
the nature of your project. The number and nature oflimitations will vary with each 
project, although each project will have its limitations. So although it is true that there is 
no baklava that is more baklava than any other, it is also true that certain things just are 
not baklavas because as Heldke (1992: 260) writes, "recipes are not infinitely flexible". 
Fourth, Heldke (1992: 261) argues that we need to understand the relationship 
between "me and my recipe". Given that recipes are flexib le, cooks have the challenge of 
guessing how flexible a new recipe is. Learning the limits ofa recipe is part of the 
process of learning how to cook. This is a self-reflective process because in deducing the 
flexibility of a recipe, I need to know my own proficiency and how I will be able to work 
and interpret the instructions. Heldke (1992: 261) claims that the cook needs to think 
about how "I-and-the-recipe work together"; that is, how the cook needs to interpret the 
instructions given by the writer of the recipe. The implication of this claim is that it is 
important to consider the source of the recipe/theory if one is to figure out its flexibility 
and that the commands in recipes are better understood if the motives of the recipe-giver 
are known. 
Fifth, Heldke (1992: 262) offers a solution for how we can overcome flops in the 
kitchen: thoughtful practice - this includes following the recipe more carefully, making 
your own changes and asking others for advice. It is also possible that your recipe fails 
because the recipe creator has intentionally exchanged an ingredient or instruction, to 
ensure the "superiority" oftheir products. The implications of these recipe failures in 
terms of theory-making is that we must not think of the theory-creator as this "semi-
omniscient" person who "unveils a set of universally-applicable laws about a bunch of 
mute, lifeless Stuff of the Universe" (Heldke 1992: 262). Nor must we think of the 
theory-recipient as being able to simply take up another's theory and follow its 
"unambiguous universally-applicable instructions" in an unproblematic way, and apply it 
to the same ·phenomena successfully, and hence theorising is not a "one-sided activity of 
32 
, ,'... . , .. . ~ . " 
a detached subject" (Heldke 1992: 263). When cooks use recipes, they enter into a kind 
ofrelation with the ingredients. Cooks are not completely separate from the ingredients, 
Tlor do they have total power over them. Bread making is a good example of this point 
because it is a process that is seldom perfected on the first attempt. 
Heldke (1992: 264) claims that this assertion is most obviously true when we theorise 
about other people, although she argues that it is relevant even for the "hard sciences". 
When we approach another person's theory, it is useful to inquire about the conditions 
that prompted the development ofthat theory. It is also necessary to see how the their 
experiences relate, challenge and conflict with ours and this knowledge will help us to 
consider how their theories fit or challenge our theories and hence their usefulness and 
applicability. The relation between the two theorisers is always central to the theorising 
process and the more developed the relation, the better equipped the theory-receiver is to 
modify and use the theory. 
Heldke's "methodological cookbook" attempts to offer a unique way to think about 
philosophical theorising. A foodist doing epistemology would advocate Heldke's 
"Coresponsible Option" and assert that theories are merely tools, where there is not one 
better theory. This idea reinforces the claims from the previous chapter in which I 
discussed styles of philosophy. Just as some styles are better suited to certain subject 
matter, there cannot be one style that reigns supreme. Foodists would assert that inquiry 
is a communal activity in which the relationships between the inquirer and inquired need 
to be emphasised. Heldke 's summary also shows how it is possible to rethink old 
assumptions such as the absolutist/relativist dichotomy. Through thinking about cooking, 
she has shown that there are novel ways to understand philosophical theories. 
h) A Foodist Ethics 
Kass (1994: 97) argues that humans connect the domain of nature with the domain of the 
ethical and that humans are the only species who engage in "ethicising". Humans are the 
only species that are self-conscious of how best to live and who aspire to have knowledge 
of the good. Humans have a unique feature: both our physiques and psyches are adapted 
for "openness". Humans are open in awareness and appreciation, receptive to all forms of 
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pleasure, free to act and most importantly, to engage with other humans. Kass claims that 
there is a "great paradox of life" evident in the necessity of eating. All living forms need 
\0 threaten life and form, in order to maintain their own life and form and eating is 
simultaneously form preserving and form destroying. This paradox of eating reflects how 
human eating is necessarily linked to ethics. Kass claims that generally ethics is 
concerned with restrictions and "nay-saying". Given humans' indeterminate omnivorous 
appetites, he argues that limitations and constrains are necessary. 
Although Kass is involved in a foodist project, other than connecting eating to ethics, 
he does very little meta-ethical analysis, hence before I discuss the virtues and vices of 
eating, I offer a meta-ethical account that represents the sort of approach a foodist would 
take regarding ethical issues. 
In the 'Foodist Metaphysics" section, I discussed the conception ofthe participatory 
conception of self and how the moral agent is deeply connected to others in a complex 
pattern of defining relations. This fact of human connectedness has implications for a 
foodist ethic. Curtin (1992: 124) cites Thich Nhat Hanh, who claims that a participatory 
understanding of self results in an ethic "in awareness" of our ineluctable connectedness 
to others. A foodist would adopt both the feminist ethic of care and the Buddhist ethic of 
compassion in order to affirn1 the participatory character of a healthy self. Both the ethic 
of care and ethic of compassion "understand the process of living in terms of a context-
specific moral/aesthetic narrative which is guided by an awareness of one's defining 
relations to others" (Curtin 1992: 124). Curtin states that it is neither possible nor 
desirable to offer a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the ethic of care or 
compassion because both are pluralist and affirm difference as real. Curtin's (1992: 124) 
project involves the consideration of the "transition from a food-based conception of 
personhood to a re-oriented conception of value". 
Here is a summary of Curtin's (1992: 124) account: 
1. Curtin offers a description of how a dualist hierarchy, which constructs food 
as objectified (external and objectified), might value food. 
2. There is a characterisation of a participatory understanding of value as a direct 
or authentic presence to food. 
3. This "mindful" focus on food reflects our relatedness to what we choose to 
count as food. 
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4. Therefore, our food choices represent who we are morally. 
5. Ethic of care or compassion is sympathetic to theidea of an authentiC 
presence to food. 
6. The connection between awareness of food and value has implications for 
how we value other human beings and things with which we may enter into 
relations of compassion and care. 
7. Contextual moral vegetarianism is an example of a meaningful response to an 
acknowledgement of ourselves as directly related to the food we eat. 
I now expand on the most relevant foodist features of Curtin's account. Curtin (1992: 
127) cites the Japanese philosopher Dagen who was interested in the relationship of food 
in the understanding of personhood and value. During a trip to China in 1223, Dagen 
learnt that enlightenment should not be separate from ordinary life. He discovered that 
forming a mindful relationship to ordinary things like food could forge the path to self-
understanding. Dagen is famous for making the lenzo, the temple cook, one of the most 
important positions in the temple after the abbot. Dagen understands our participatory 
relations to food and he claims that we must be present to the food we eat. This means 
that we must discover our ordinary selves simply through eating. Being mindful of the 
food we eat allows us to be aware of the temporality and relationality of life. It also 
allows one to acknowledge the self and the food uniting in each moment. 
The idea of the "authentic presence to food" that the Dagen advocates expresses the 
idea that eating is an act in relation to others (Curtin 1992: 128). Food therefore becomes 
something that we consume with others in mind. Curtin argues that there are moral and 
aesthetic consequences that emerge in the act of mindful eating. Our choice of food is 
therefore a conscious expression of who we are morally. An authentic presence to food 
makes us aware of how our food becomes part of us physically, politically and spiritually. 
Curtin (1992: 130) concludes that having an authentic presence to food can lead us to 
acknowledge our responsibility within our context and food practices. Bound up in the 
idea of mindful eating are both the ethic of awareness and the ethic of care. An authentic 
presence to food leads to an awareness of the relations we have with food and other 
humans. This knowledge of our connectedness to others inevitably leads to an ethic of 
care in which we respect and nurture our relationships with other humans and the world 
at large. 
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Versveld (1983: 27) makes a similar claim to Curtin's although he approaches the 
subject matter in a different way. Versveld develops his account ofthe ethic of awareness 
and ethic of care though a discussion of human food production, specifically agriculture. 
Versveld claims that human advancement is evident in the advancement of human food 
production. Agriculture is a good example of humans manipulating, controlling and 
acting upon the world in which they live. Versveld (1983: 27) believes that we "humanise 
the landscape by producing food", that human knowledge and virtue are visible in our 
ploughed fields and that our food production also signifies humanity "living together" 
and "giving mutual aid". Versveld (1983: 27) describes this human communalism that is 
apparent in our food practices: 
That landscape is something that we made, that we have lifted up to a person. 
I see it because we see it. Our very sense perceptions are communal. It is not 
simply a matter of 'I see a plough' but of 'we see a plough through me'. The 
plough is history. It took many ages to invent. Only co-operation makes history, 
and there is a very real sense in which time itself is man-made. 
Versveld's description of the ethic of care is developed through the acknowledgement of 
human communalism and necessary sociality. On Versveld's account a foodist ethic 
would look similar to an "African"s ethic of ubuntu. Ubuntu expresses the idea that "I am 
because we are" and hence reinforces the earlier claim that as we are defined by our 
relations to others and that we need to live in awareness of these relations. 
A further implication of a foodist's ethics of care and compassion is that we not only 
enter into defining relations with other human beings, but with the environment too. The 
legacy of dualism not only left its imprint on the way we understand the nature of a 
human being but also how we understand our world. There is a Cartesian assumption that 
parts are individual and autonomous entities and are independent of the whole. Jackson 
(1992: 360) argues that the consequence ofthis view is that we conceive of "the 
environment" as something "apart from us". But as Jackson, Kass and Versveld have 
argued, humans are made from the environment and maintained by it: we are not distinct 
from our environment, we are our environment. Jackson argues that we must rethink 'the 
8 The idea that "buntu is exclusively an "African" ethic, has been critiqued by Archbishop Desmond Tutu. 
Tutu claims that "bunt" needs to be understood as a universal ethic that loses its force if not applied and 
practiced generally and by everyone. 
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problem of agriculture" as rather a problem of our culture and society. As long as humans 
continue to objectify nature, our environmental problems will never be solved. Jackson 
~iscusses how we need to rethink our understanding of the concepts of part and whole. 
He cites Levins and Lewontins who advocate a view of the concept of a part and whole 
as a dialectical relationship i.e. that parts and wholes evolve in consequence of their 
relationship and that the relationship itself evolves. 
From this meta-ethical discussion of foodist ethics it should be evident that foodism 
advocates a unique approach to ethical issues. Foodists are not so much concerned with 
developing universal laws and IUles but rather with considering the relationships within a 
particular situation or context. Foodists acknowledge that our participatory relations with 
others and the world define us . It follows from this assumption that foodists value these 
interdependent relations and practice an ethic of care and compassion in order to maintain 
and nurture these relationships . 
Within this framework, foodists would value certain virtues more than others. Telfer 
(1996) discusses two moral virtues that are specifically related to food, namely 
hospitableness and temperance. Telfer's use of hospitable ness mainly refers to the 
hosting of friends for a meal, whereas Kass' account of hospitality refers to the hosting of 
strangers for a meal. Implications of their accounts remain similar. Hospitableness is 
concerned with how a host treats her guests and temperance is concerned with an 
individual's eating habits . Telfer (1996: 82) argues that the former is a virtue in its own 
right and not merely an agreeable quality as commonly thought. The latter is considered a 
traditional virtue and gluttony its opposing vice. She attempts to rescue temperance from 
its rather narrow and negative conceptions. 
Telfer argues that hospitableness is a moral virtue because it is closely linked with 
friendship, and foregrounds the question of whether morality can be partial, and entitle us 
to favour some people over others. It also raises the question of whether a moral virtue is 
one to which all people should aspire. She believes that certain virtues are optional and 
are related to particular choices of how to carry out more general moral obligations, and 
that hospitableness is an optional virtue. Telfer argues that hospitableness is not based on 
anyone motive, but derives its distinctive character from the value that hospitable people 
attach to a p'articular ideal (Telfer 1996: 82). 
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Kass (1994: 106) discusses the virtue of hospitality and how this virtue is connected 
to that virtue of eating, which is connected to the realisation of the good life and how 
\lospitality recognises the vulnerability, neediness, and ultimately the humanity ofthe 
stranger. We are self-conscious of our neediness. It reflects our mutual vulnerability and 
dependence on others. Hospitality also recognises the home and nature's beneficence. 
Although a host is mimicking nature's generosity, nature's gifts are unintended whereas 
human hospitality is deliberate and self-aware. Kass argues that the virtue of hospitality is 
an example of how humans are superior to other animals. Feeding oneself is obligatory, 
but feeding another is liberal, that is free. Hospitality brings together generosity, needy 
vitality and human self-consciousness and the recognition of preserving, yet moderating 
the distinction between the self and other. 
2.S Conclusion 
This chapter has defined and explained a particular style of philosophy - foodism. My 
account of food ism is merely one example of many possible foodist accounts. The aim of 
this chapter was to show how foodism could be used as a tool to approach philosophical 
problems in a new and creative way. This chapter has set the foundation for my critique 
of Plato's Symposium. In the third chapter I will offer an account of Plato ' s Symposium 
and an analysis of certain interpretations of it. In the fourth chapter I will reread 
Symposium from a foodist's perspective to test whether Plato's conception oflove could 
be read as a foodist's conception oflove. 
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Chapter 3 
What is Plato's conception of love in the Symposium? 
3.1 Chapter Introduction 
In this chapter I analyse Plato's Symposium . The Symposium is a play about eros, simply 
translated as love9 I summarise the Symposium and then discuss various interpretations 
of it according to : Kahn (1996), Ferrari (1992), Price (1989), Vlastos (1999), Rutherford 
(1995) and Nussbaum (1986). I argue that this is indeed a play about eros and that 
Plato's view oflove is expressed in Socrates' speech. I prove that the Symposium 
suggests that love - for Plato - is an ascent to love of the Forms. 
3.2 Summary of Plato's Symposium 
The Symposium presents a convivial gathering in 416 B.C. narrated by ApollodonIS to a 
friend some years later. ApollodonIS was not present at this dinner party but claims that 
he heard about it from his friend, Aristodemus. The narrative looks upon a time when the 
Athenian Empire was still powerful. Although the person who relates the events of the 
dinner was absent from it, Plato creates vivid scenes in which the reader is always aware 
of the physical context of the play. 
The play is about a symposium, or "drinks party", a ritual gathering in Ancient Greek 
Society at Agathon's house. This "drinks party" was a convivium of men from the upper 
echelons of Greek society and it involved eating and drinking (Waterfield 1994). The 
consumption of alcohol was more highly valued than that of food, and always followed 
the eating. The rituals of eating were primarily concerned with the distribution rather than 
consumption of sacrificial meat. However, it was the drinking of wine that involved the 
most elaborate ritualisation. There was a distinctive 'sympotic space' in which 
participants would sit on reclining couches that were arranged in the shape of a horseshoe 
9 A more substantial discussion about the word eros and its possible meanings will come later in the essay. 
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(Murray 1990). Sclunitt-Pantel (1990: 19) discusses how Archaic pottery reflects the 
main elements ofa symposium: 
the equal distribution of food and wine; 
the exchange of conversation, of singing, and of different fOTITIS of pleasure; 
the insertion of commensality in a whole framework of civic activities. 
Entertairunent at a symposium included female pipe-players or dancers, acrobats and 
mimes, conversation, songs, riddles, and party games. However, in Plato's Symposium, 
the guests agree to send away the hired entertairunent and to amuse themselves by 
presenting speeches (encomia) in praise of the god, Love personified. Another feature of 
this party at Agathon's house is that the guests agree not to drink excessive amounts of 
alcohol, as they are suffering from the after-effects of the previous evening's party. Given 
these features, this particular symposium is a relatively sober and restrained affair in 
comparison with the typical debauchery that was commonplace at these functions. 
Another pertinent feature of Plato's Symposium is that the characters in this play are 
based on people who really existed in Athens at that time. The host, Agathon, was a 
famous tragic playwright, and Plato's Symposium is set in the winter of 416 B.C., just 
after Agathon's earliest play won first prize at an Athenian dramatic festival. Phaedrus 
was a famous poet, Pausanias was Agathon's lover, Eryximachus was a professional 
doctor, Aristophanes was the greatest playwright of Athenian Old Comedy, Socrates was 
. the famous philosopher and Alcibiades was the charismatic and wealthy Athenian hero 
who squandered all his talent and opportunity. Rutherford (1995 : 190) describes how the 
styles of all the speeches reflect the characters' real life personalities. Phaedrus' speech is 
filled with mythical illusions; Pausanius' speech offers a sociological analysis; 
Aristophanes' speech is comical and focuses on the physical aspects oflove; Agathon's 
speech is an "ornate but vacuous eulogy"; Socrates offers a dialectical argument in which 
Love and the lover become a seeker of goodness; and Alcibiades' speech is a personal 
account of his love for Socrates. 
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Eryximachus proposes that they should each present a speech in praise of Love, as 
poets and writers of prose encomia lo have unfairly neglected this god. Phaedrus presents 
,the first speech, which is poetic and filled with literary references. His main point about 
love is that Love is the "primordial god" and a potent force for moral behaviour 
(Symposium 178c). Pausanius is mostly concerned with the "social ethos of 
homosexuality as practised in Athens" (Rutherford 1995: 186). His speech highlights the 
"moral ambivalence oflove" and the "educational potential of a love affair" (Waterfield 
1994: xxiii) . The third speech is that of Eryximachus, who offers a "pseudo-scientific 
exposition" in which he claims that Love is necessary for the science of medicine, 
gymnastics, farming, poetry, and music (Rutherford 1995: 186). Eryximachus extends the 
concept of eros beyond the scope of human relations to things like harmony and health. 
Thus he "dilutes the term so far as to make it almost meaningless" (Rutherford 1995: 
187). 
Aristophanes is the fourth speaker whose speech takes the form of a myth II, in which 
he tells an aetiological tale about the suffering of humans because oflove. Waterfield 
(1994: xxiii) describes this speech as "exceptional for its Rabelaisian whimsy, its pathos 
and psychological insight". Aristophanes tells the myth about how once humans were 
whole creatures l 2 who were punished by Zeus because they attempted to climb to heaven 
to attack the gods. Zeus punished them by dividing each whole into two halves. Since 
then, the human condition involves a constant search for our lost halves in a "painful 
quest for completeness" (Rutherford 1995: 187). This speech attempts to offer an internal 
account of love: to describe what love actually feels like. Love may be a "universal 
10 Encomia were works that praised certain subjects, often deities, and had distinct stylistic characteristics. 
In Plato's Symposium, it is Agathon's speech that most closely resembles an encomium. Encomia were 
composed in a highly Gorgianic style in which rhetorical grandiloquence resulted in much untruthfulness, a 
con1ffion trait of this genre. 
I I Plato often used myths in his dialogues. Not only was he a myth-teller (i.e. recounted versions of 
traditional Greek myths) but he was also a myth-maker (invented his own myths) too. For Plato, a myth as 
a whole must be taken as false, but there are truthful insights in it too. Myths are not only fictional (made-
up), but they are fantastical (unrealistic) . He used myths as he considered them to be an efficient means of 
persuasion. He also thought that myths are sometimes the only device that allows us to explore matters that 
are beyond our limited intellectual powers. It is myth that allows us access to approximate truths about 
what lies beyond experience (Partenie 2004). I would liken Plato's myths to our modem day philosophical 
thought experiments. 
12 According t9 this mythical tale there used to be three human genders, namely male, female and 
androgynous i.e. both male and female. Each person' s shape was round with their backs and sides forming 
a circle; four hands, four legs and two identical faces on a cylindrical neck (Symposillm 190a). 
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cosmic force", but Aristophanes' speech shows how in humans, love is a longing for lost 
happiness and completeness (Waterfield 1994: xxv). 
The rhetorical structure of Agathon's speech comes closest to that of a conventional 
encomium. Agathon does not offer an argument; rather he waxes lyrical about Love's 
beauty, in the most extravagant poetic style. His speech leaves an impression that Love is 
beautiful like a11 the nice things we notice around us when we are in the throes oflove. 
Socrates speech is often described as the climax of the dialogue. However, before he 
begins, he offers a "mischievous refutation" of Agathon's position in order to pave the 
way for his own teaching (Rutherford 1995 : 191). He then introduces the Matinean 
priestess Diotima, who he claims taught him a11 he knows about love. Socrates offers a 
radical redefinition of love in which he describes the abandonment of individual love in 
favour of a gradual ascent to love of purity and virtue itself. He describes the ascent as 
one from imperfect instances oflove to love of the absolute world of the Forms. For 
Socrates, the lover becomes the philosopher, one who aspires to beauty and goodness that 
can only be found in the divine and eternal and love is the desire for goodness 
(Rutherford 1995: 193). It is through Beauty that the object of love is reached. The object 
of Love is happiness, or permanent possession of goodness. Although we are attracted to 
beauty, our real goal is happiness (Waterfield 1994: xxxi i). 
Alcibiades, who stumbles in late and drunk and has not heard any of the previous 
speeches, presents the last speech. Instead of praising the god Love, he praises Socrates. 
He is not concerned with Love in general but rather with his own particular experience of 
love. His speech is disorderly, chaotic, unstructured and contains many contradictions. 
He inverts the role of the erastes (lover) and eromenos (beloved) and his speech is 
essentially a tale of unrequited love for Socrates. For A1cibiades, the love he understands 
can only be consummated in physical sex . 
The play concludes with Socrates arguing with the comic poet Aristophanes and the 
tragic poet Agathon, about how a tragic poet can be a comic one and vice versa. 
42 
..... - , .. . . .. . . 
3.3 Discussion of eros 
In the introduction I claimed that Plato's Symposium is commonly described as a 
~ialogue about eros and that the most common translation of eros is love. However eros 
also carries connotations of a particular sort of love. Kahn (1996: 258) points out that the 
Greeks have two words that correspond to the English word "love", namely eros and 
philia. The former denotes sexual passion whereas the latter refers to milder forms of 
affection and is generally translated as friendship. Vlastos (1999: 138) writes that eros is 
more intense, more passionate; more heavily weighted on the side of desire than of 
affection; and it is also more closely tied to the sexual drive - whereas philia is "non-
incestual familial love". Nussbaum (1986: 167) translates eros as "passionate erotic 
love". 
Kahn (1996) offers an alternative interpretation of eros. He believes that Plato uses 
erOs to suggest the strongest form of desire. Kahn states that Plato's interest is not desire 
in general, but rather desire of what is beautiful (to kalan) and what is beautiful is closely 
linked to what is good (agathan). Kahn (1996: 260) also discusses the structure of eros. 
Kahn claims that eros can be asymmetrical, whereas ph ilia is properly reciprocal. 
Reciprocity is secondary or accidental in the case of eros. This structure maps onto the 
Greek view of boy-love (the paidika) in which the object of passion - the eramenas - is 
not expected to feel passion or desire in return. It is in Plato's Phaedrus in which the 
notion of erotic reciprocity is introduced - anteros (eros in return) that is explained as the 
result of the beloved seeing his own reflection in the lover's eyes (Phaedrus 255c-d). 
Kahn believes that eros, unlike ph ilia, can point in only one direction. Kahn (1996: 261) 
explains how this asymmetric structure of eros fits the relation between the human 
psyche and the good-and-beautiful. Kahn states that reciprocal relations between persons 
would have to be treated in an account of ph ilia. 
Although I agree with Kahn that eros can be an asymmetrical relation, it is not 
necessarily so and although reciprocity may be secondary, it is certainly possible. For this 
reason eros can be understood as a relation between two individuals in love with each 
other. Clearly in an ideal situation, both individuals experience eros to the same degree. 
I believe that Plato uses eros to describe passionate erotic love, and not just the 
"strongest form of desire" as Kahn supposes. Kahn's translation is far too vague, and 
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could include the desire to survive, desire to eat or to drink - all of which could become 
the "strongest desire". Alcibiades and Aristophanes are not referring only to strong 
desire, but particularly to passionate erotic desire that is associated with sexual 
intercourse. 
Kahn's point about the asymmetrical structure of eros is also incorrect. Eros is not 
necessarily asymmetrical, although it can be. Aristophanes' speech is an example of eros 
that is reciprocated and Alcibiades ' speech is an example of unrequited eros. Kahn 's 
mistakes are a result of a common error of exclusively reading Socrates' speech and 
ignoring the other six speeches in the dialogue. 
I will now discuss the various interpretations of Plato's Symposium, beginning with 
the accounts that claim that this is not a play about eros. 
3.4 Interpretations of Plato's Symposium 
a) The Symposium is not about eros 
I will begin with Kahn's (1996) interpretation of Plato's Symposium. Kahn 
acknowledges that eros was independently established as a central theme in Socratic 
literature, but that Plato's account of eros was developed less for its own sake than for a 
further philosophical purpose. Kahn (1996: 258) argues that Plato's theory of eros 
provides an "essential link between his moral psychology and his metaphysical doctrine 
of the Forms" and that the Symposium provides a "transitional moment between the 
inconclusive treatment of virtue, knowledge, and education in the aporetic dialogues, and 
the great constructive theories of the Phaedo and Republic." He is primarily concerned 
with the broader function of Plato's theory of eros, which has moral and metaphysical 
implications. 
Kahn believes that Plato does not offer a comprehensive theory of love, but rather he 
is concerned with eros as the strongest form of desire. He states that Plato 's interest does 
not lie in desire in general but rather desire of what is beautiful (to kaloll) and what is 
beautiful is closely linked to what is good (agathon). For Kahn, the Symposium offers an 
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account of rational desire for the good understood as the "good-and-beautiful" and not a 
theory oflove. 
This account is the result of a reading of the Symposium that is exclusively focused on 
Socrates' speech. This speech represents an exposition of an ascent to the Forms, and fits 
into Plato's other theoretical frameworks. However, to maintain this view is to ignore 
some valuable insights about love that the Symposium has to offer. The Symposium is a 
dialogue of seven speeches, and to focus on only one of them, is to miss Plato's other . 
objectives. Perhaps Plato's work in the Symposium does have implications for his moral 
and metaphysical theories, and hence a broader function, but I still believe that this was 
not Plato's only purpose in writing this play. Although I concede that Kahn's argument is 
valuable, it misses many of Plato's insights. 
Ferrari (1992) is another theorist who argues that the Symposium is not ultimately 
about love for love's sake. However, unlike Kahn, he does not base his argument on an 
exclusive reading of Socrates' speech. Ferrari's main claim is that Plato does not have a 
comprehensive theory of love, but rather that he uses common ideas about love towards 
his own philosophic ends. His argument is based on a comparative analysis of love in the 
Symposium and love in the Phaedrus. Ferrari believes that in these two works, Plato is 
not offering the reader an account of what it would be like to live with someone as a 
platonic lover but rather that Plato's aim in the Symposium is to construct a bridge 
between love and philosophy. 
An interesting claim that Ferrari (1992: 248) makes is that the "speechmaking in the 
Symposium is rooted in bad faith". Ferrari offers two reasons for this claim. Firstly, 
praising eros is not as inviting or as easy as Phaedrus suggests because love for the 
ancient Greeks, was a bittersweet source of ambivalence. Love was thought to be the 
source of one of the greatest of human pleasures, but also of agony and madness. 
Secondly, Ferrari (1992: 249) points out that the speeches are the "epitome of 
moderation", reflecting the speakers' limited intake of alcohol and he thinks that the 
previous evening's binge is an "insalubrious motive for self control". The implication of 
this sober state of affairs is that the speeches (barring Alcibiades) are abstract and lacking 
in excitement. The result is that none of the first six speeches praise love for how is 
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makes a person feel, but rather for the moral growth, wholeness, social peace, graceful 
living, and philosophic enlightenment that proceed from it (Ferrari 1992: 250). 
Ferrari (1992: 250) also points out that the chief structural marker is Aristophanes' 
attack ofhiccoughs (Symposium 185d-e). These hiccoughs serve to change the order of 
speakers as Eryximachus and Aristophanes are switched. The result of this switch, 
according to Ferrari, is that the speeches are divided into two groups. The first group is 
Phaedrus, Pausaniaus, and Eryximachus and the speeches in this group distinguish 
between good and bad forms of love (Phaedrus implicitly and the others explicitly). The 
second group is Aristophanes, Agathon, and Socrates, and these speeches all allude to the 
idea that love is directed at one object and that all love is praiseworthy. 
For Ferrari (1992: 261), the first five speeches are part of Plato's rhetorical strategy in 
which he builds his account of what love can do for philosophy. Ferrari's view is thus 
similar to Kahn's in that the Symposium is not really an account of love for its own sake. 
In the earlier speeches, Phaedrus and Pausanias describe what love can do for manly 
virtue, Eryximachus describes what love can do for the sciences, Agathon describes what 
love can do for the appreciation of beauty, and Aristophanes describes what love can do 
for piety. The climax is where Socrates explains what love can do for philosophy. 
It is A1cibiades' speech that Ferrari thinks addresses the traditional bittersweetness of 
love. Alcibadiades is in love rather than understands love. He is the first to praise the 
object of his love - Socrates - for how he makes him feel. A1cibiades falls in love with 
the wise philosopher, instead of loving wisdom. 
Although Ferrari does analyse the other speeches, his position is similar to Kahn's, in 
that he also thinks that we need to read Plato's theor(ies) oflove in the light of his other 
philosophical works, and not merely for its own sake. Although the Symposium appears 
to be concerned with love, Plato uses ideas about love for his other philosophic ideas. 
I believe that both Kahn and Ferrari's accounts are incorrect and miss important 
insights of this play. Certainly, the Symposium will have important implications for 
Plato's other theories, but first and foremost this is a play about love. Why would Plato 
offer seven speeches in praise of love ifhe were not concerned with love for love's sake? 
Plato has dedicated an entire work to the discussion of love, and to deny that this is a play 
about love is to misconstrue Plato's intentions. 
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I believe that these arguments reflect the confusion about what Plato's actual 
conception oflove is. Plato is not particularly clear about wnich view oflove he is 
advocating, especially as on the surface, he seems to be offering seven different 
perspectives. Although there is ambiguity about what Plato considers love to be, I do not 
think that it should follow that this is then not a play about love. Another possible reason 
is that many have interpreted Plato's view oflove to be love of the Forms. Given that 
Plato's love is distinctly different from our traditional conceptions oflove, people have 
said that this is therefore not a play about love. 
b) The Symposium is about eros 
The following five theorists all agree that this is indeed a play about love. What 
distinguishes their interpretations is how they read the dialogue. Price (1989) and Vlastos 
(1999) focus exclusively on Socrates' speech; Rutherford (1995) analyses both Socrates' 
and Alcibiades' speeches as complements of each other; and Nussbaum (1986) considers 
the arrangement of Aristophanes', Socrates', and Alcibiades' speeches. As each 
interpretation focuses on different aspects of the Symposium, each interpretation offers a 
different view of Plato's conception of love. 
Price's account offers an analysis of Socrates' description of the ascent. Price argues 
that Plato believes that the forms are the most worthy objects of our love. However, Price 
still thinks that Plato's account has room for the beloved to accompany the lover, 
although their relationship at the peak of the summit is remarkably different to that at the 
start. Price's account attempts to retain all aspects oflove: physical, intellectual, 
individual and general. 
Price (1989: 15) begins with a discussion of how Diotima defines eros. For Diotima 
love is "for the good to belong to oneself always" (Symposium 206a 11-12) or, as Price 
translates it: "love is for the possessing the good oneself for ever". This definition is 
extended and stipulative and, ultimately, a statement of the final goal of all desire (Price 
1989: 15). Diotima states that love's central activity is the mental or physical generation 
of beautyll. 
\J Socrates uses an analogy of pregnancy (procreation) to make this point. 
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Price (1989: 15) explains how the 'beautiful' (to kalon) is central to love. Firstly, 
beauty is love's goal (i.e. the lover desires to possess beauty'within generic eros) and 
secondly, beauty is love's occasion (i.e. the lover is inspired by someone else who 
already possesses beauty within specific eros). Price (1989: 17) clarifies the claim that 
beauty is the goal of love: this needs to be understood in a wider sense - the goal aims to 
acquire the good forever. Central to this idea is goodness, and not beauty, ownership or 
immortalityl4. 
Diotima then explains how love's goal - beauty-and-goodness - can be reached and 
this is commonly referred to the ascent passage. Briefly, she describes the lover as 
advancing from a single beautiful body to all beautiful bodies,15 then to the beauty of 
practices, then to the beauty of sciences, and finally to the Form of Beauty itself (Price 
1989: 37). Price points out some absurdities of this explanation of the ascent to Beauty: 
either we are in love with the Form Beauty, which is a mystery (only "dimly lit by sexual 
metaphor") or else it starts to look like Don Juanism - love for all beautiful bodies. 
Price (1989: 36) explains that there are two possible moves that can be made in order 
to avoid these absurdities of an "impersonal eroticism without denying any erotic losses 
to be set against intellectual gains." Either one can attempt to personalise the later stages 
or de-eroticise the starting point. Price (1989: 36-37) quotes Walter Pater who attempts 
the former by making Beauty an object of personal affection by claiming, "abstract ideas 
themselves become animated, living persons, almost corporeal, as if with hands and 
eyes" when one is in love. Although Pater's account maintains the erotic aspect 
throughout the ascent, he does so by misconstming Plato's conception of the Fonns. 
Price (1989: 37) correctly points out that the Forms according to Plato are "pure, clear, 
unalloyed, not full of human flesh and hues and much other mortal trash" and therefore 
Beauty cannot reciprocate affection. 
The other option is to intellectualise the ascent from the very beginning. Price (1989: 
37) cites lM.E. Moravcsik, who denies that love is even initially sexual desire. For 
14 Price enters into an in-depth discussion about how we should understand Diotima's reference to 
immortality. He brings in a discussion ofpersonal identity. For the purposes of this chapter, I cannot go 
into further details of his discussion. 
15 Price poinls out that we should understand the concept of Ihe "Platonic body": which is not "unconscious 
and Cartesian" but rather a "partaker of pleasures, passions, even opinions, ofa kind" (Price 1989:36). 
Hence what Plato means when he says we must love a body, is that we must love a person. 
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Moravcsik, love is not merely sexual desire, but rather an aesthetic aspiration. Eros is 
defined as the "over-all desire or wish for what is taken to be good" (Moravcsik quoted 
in Price 1989: 37). Price (1989: 38) argues that Moravcsik is wrong to ignore or devalue 
the passionate aspect of eros because it is that passionate aspect that Plato uses as the 
impetus for the ascent. Price believes that in the ascent passage, Plato links the 
intellectual with the erotic. Given that neither option is successful as a solution, Price 
claims that the way to understand the ascent is to accommodate all its aspects, namely, 
personal and aesthetic, emotional and intellectual. 
Price (1989: 39) proposes a structured translation of Diotima's programme: 
Al He must love one body, 
A2 and generate beautiful discourse, 
A3 and then realise that the beauty of anyone body is closely akin to that of any other, 
and that, if one must pursue beauty of appearance, it is great folly not to consider the 
beauty of all bodies one and the same; 
A4 having realised this he must become a lover of all beautiful bodies, and slacken his 
intense love of the one, disdaining it and thinking little of it; 
B1 after this he must think beauty in souls more honourable than that in the body, with 
the result that, if someone was capable in his soul and had even a little bloom, that would 
suffice for his loving and caring for him 
B2 and bringing forth such discourse as will improve young men, 
B3 in order that he may now be forced to look upon the beauty in practices and laws and 
see that it is all akin itself to itself, 
B4 in order that he may think the surface beauty of the body a little thing; 
C1 after practices he must be led to sciences, so that he may now see the beauty of these, 
C2 and looking towards beauty already in its width he may no longer be base and mean-
spirited in his slavery to the beauty of one (loving, in a menial way, the beauty of a 
certain boy or man, or ofa single practice), but having turned to the wide sea of beauty 
and contemplating it 
C3 he may bring forth much beautiful and fine discourse and thoughts in unlimited 
philosophy, 
D until, strengthened and nourished there, he catches sight of a certain science, which is 
single and such as to be of the following beauty. 
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Price (1989: 39) claims that there are two progressions in this ascent, namely 
generalisation and ascension. Generalisation occurs within the levels namely A3, B3 and 
~2 and ascension takes place between the levels A, B and C. Generalisation transpires 
because of reflection, and results in a realisation or understanding that beauty in one 
person is equally present in other persons. According to Price (1989: 40) there are two 
roles of generalisation, namely "consolidation" and "intimation". The former refers to an 
awareness of a reduced commitment to or valuation of an inferior object for example 
individual physical beauty. The latter refers to the ability to grasp universals (i.e. 
interrelated beauties of souls, practises and laws) and hence develop a proficiency in the 
ability to understand the Form Beauty. According to Price (1989: 40), generalisation 
arises out of reflection, but what gives rise to ascension (i.e. movement between the 
levels) is not so obvious. 
I agree with Price's second point, although I disagree with his claim about 
generalisation. Just because I have experience of beauty in one person, does not 
necessarily mean that beauty is equally present in other persons or that through reflection 
I can know this. Perhaps I can imagine through reflection, the possibility of other persons 
instantiating beauty, yet surely it is only through experience of another person's beauty 
that I can know that other persons have beauty. Is it really possible to believe that beauty 
in one individual is the same as beauty in another individual? Given Western conceptions 
of beauty and how it is closely linked with conceptions of originality and uniqueness, I 
think that the process of generalisation is more obscure than Price is willing to admit. 
Even if generalisation is possible, is it something that can aIise exclusively out of 
reflection? I think that generalisation would only arise through extensive experience and 
that would lead to Don Juanism. 
Price (1989: 40-42) offers a few unsatisfactory reasons for wanting to make the 
Socratic ascent, including a guide's influence such as Diotma, and Irwin's suggestion that 
the process is elenctic. 16 Price (1989: 42) prefers the view of "retrospective justification" 
because Diotima describes the ascent as a seIies of attractions rather than a series of 
16 Irwin's explanation <as cited by Price 1989:42) rests on the idea of dissatisfaction. At each stage the 
individual test~ his/her aspirations against his/her present objects of admiration and discover that they are 
inadequate. This view requires that the individual has his/her heart set on reaching the sununit of the Forms 
or as Price states, "a prenatal apprehension of the Forms". 
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dissatisfactions. Retrospective justification means that each stage justifies itself once the 
guide has prompted the movement up i.e. to perceive the new beauty is to appreciate it. 
price also explores the lover's interest in beauty. The ascent-passage only refers to the 
Form of Beauty, yet the passage also states how this ascent will yield "true virtue" 
(Symposium 212a5-6). True virtue necessarily includes both justice and wisdom. In the 
Republic, it is evident that Goodness plays a unifying role. Price (1989: 43) also claims 
that for Plato, 'good' and 'beautiful' have the same extension but not the same sense, as 
the good is good for me, while the beautiful is good to contemplate. Beauty is relevant to 
the ascent passage because to be a beautiful object, is also to be an appropriate object of 
love. Hence the Forms are the most appropriate and ultimate objects of love. Price 
also considers what happens to the old objects of devotion as the new ones come into 
view. He argues that they are demoted rather than discarded; this is what Price describes 
as an "inclusive reading" (Price 1989: 45). A further question that Price considers is what 
happens to the beloved as the lover makes the ascent. He thinks that it is possible to 
imagine that both the lover and beloved mutually develop their interests in beauties that 
are more universal, as they make the ascent together. 
Price (1989: 53) concludes that an individual is retained as an object oflove 
throughout the later stages of the ascent, yet the kind oflife that the lover and beloved 
will eventually achieve changes considerably. Hence he attempts to avoid the objection 
that Diotima has quietly changed the subject by introducing philosophy at the summit of 
the lover's activity. It appears that Diotima ends up praising something other than love. 
Price maintains that even though Plato's theories oflove include many unfamiliar 
aspects, his theory essentially amounts to a programme for how to live the good life. This 
necessitates an intimate relationship with another individual on earth, as well as an ascent 
towards the Platonic Forms. For these reasons, Price concludes that individual love is not 
replaced by the ascent but rather glorified. 17 
Price's account attempts to 'keep his cake and eat it too'. He argues that Plato's 
conception oflove includes individual love, love for the Forms, and physical, emotional 
and intellectual love. Nussbaum (1986) on the other hand, argues that Plato offers the 
17 Price 's orig(nal account is very dense and detailed. I have merely isolated his key claims. I have not had 
the space to go into all his arguments and subtleties of his position. My aim in this chapter is to merely 
reflect various interpretations of Plato's Symposium. 
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reader an impossible choice between individual love and love of the Forms. Before I 
discuss Nussbaum's account, I will present Vlastos' (1999) objection to Price's account. 
Nussbaum, in tum, offers objections to both Price and Vlastos. 
Unlike Price who believes that the beloved accompanies the lover to the summit of 
the ascent, Vlastos argues that love at the summit is most removed from love of concrete 
human beings. Humans as the objects oflove are left somewhere in the middle of the 
ascent in favour of abstract concepts such as science and philosophy. His account is 
based on the "metaphysical core of the dialogue," where priestess-prophetess Diotima 
instructs Socrates in the "things of love" Vlastos (1999: lSI). 
Vlastos (1999: 152) begins by explaining why beauty moves us: it enables us to 
release our power to create. For Plato, the attraction of feminine beauty lies in the 
potential for paternity. Procreation, then, is a low-grade form of creativity. The next step 
is the realisation that what one loves in one individual, is similar to the beauty in many 
individuals, all of whom release the power to create. At the next level, Plato describes 
how physical excitement transforms into imaginative and intellectual energy. He places 
higher value on love of mind for mind, claiming it is an experience that is more intense 
than physical love. The lover now disdains physical beauty and becomes aware of the 
beauty of poetry , political institutions, science and philosophy. EventualJy the lover sees 
"a marvellous sort ofbeauty"- the Form of Beauty - the climax of the ascent (Symposium 
210e). 
Vlastos (1999: 153) argues that the ascent passage contains "the thick of Plato's 
ontology" - in other words - "for every generic character which spatio-temporal objects 
may have in common, Plato posits an ideal entity in which particular things 'participate ' 
so long as they have that character". Thus Plato has a tripartite ontology: 
I. The transcendent, paradigmatic form: say, the Form of Justice; 
2. The things in our experience, which may have or lack the corresponding 
character - the persons, laws, practices, states, which mayor may not be just; 
3. The character of those things - the justice they instantiate if they are just. 
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Vlastos (1999: 155) suggests that a proper study of the Symposium would need to 
consider at least three facts about its creator, Plato: that he was a homosexual, a mystic, 
!lnd a moralist. So, according to Vlastos, in order to reach a fair and balanced 
interpretation of Plato's theory of love, one would have to undertake at least three 
complementary investigations. One would first have to investigate the effect of Plato 's 
belief that heterosexual coupling is natural whereas anal intercourse is degradation not 
only of man's humanity, but of his animality too. Being homosexual and holding these 
beliefs would surely distort Plato's overall view of sexual fulfillment. In addition, his 
theory of love may be affected by his religious mysticism, and finally, his moral 
philosophy may have affected his view of love in the pattern of interpersonal relations -
the latter of which Vlastos investigates. 
Vlastos argues that Plato's theory oflove is not concerned with personal love for 
persons. He argues that the Symposium is really about "love for place-holders of the 
predicates 'useful' and 'beautiful'" (Vlastos 1999: 156). For Plato, individuals evoke 
eros if they have beautiful minds, bodies, or dispositions, but so too do impersonal 
objects such as political states, poetry, science, philosophy, and most importantly, the 
Idea of Beauty itself. By placing the impersonal objects higher up on the ascent, Plato 
signifies their superiority to persons as objects of love. Vlastos raises an interesting point 
about Plato's life: that even Plato's two strongest personal attachments - his love for 
Socrates in his youth, and his love for Dion of Syracuse later on, would only feature less 
than halfway up the summit of the ascent. 
For Vlastos (1999: 157) the great achievement of the Symposium is that Plato is the 
first Western man to acknowledge the intensity and passion that humans may feel 
towards abstract objects such as social reform, poetry, art, and philosophy. Plato's view 
has traces of Freudian erotic fixation, yet instead of explaining his motivation, Plato, 
invokes another drive - the hunger to create. This suggests that the erotic attachment of 
the lover is not directed to an individual (correctly or incorrectly), but rather to a complex 
set of qualities that the lover identifies in the beloved. 
However, the greatest problem with Plato's theory oflove, according to Vlastos 
(1999: 160) is that as a theory of interpersonal love, it states that one must love the 
'image' of his beloved, as far as they are beautiful and good. Thus the quirky, 
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individualistic traits of other individuals can never be desirable and it is never possible to 
love whole persons - only the abstract version of a complex 'of their best qualities. This 
~ontradicts the common view that true love is of the good and bad qualities that together 
constitute the whole person. For Vlastos, the climax of the summit - the fulfilment of the 
ascension - is a state that is the farthest removed from affection for real human beings. 
Thus, although Plato's theory of love is deficient in its application interpersonal love, it 
could be thought of as an account of a path to spiritual achievement. 
Vlastos (1999: 162) concludes by indicating the similarities between the structure of 
Plato's description of the ascent and the way he describes knowledge in epistemology, 
the world-order in cosmology, the interrelation of particular and universal, time and 
eternity, the world of sense and the world of thought in ontology. In each case the 
analytic pattern is the same: a transcendent Form at the one extreme, a temporal 
individual at the other, and in between the various stages of the individual's becoming. 
In all of his writings, Plato gives the Fonns pre-eminence. 
Although Vlastos argues that the Symposium should be understood in the context of 
Plato's other theories, his position is different from Kahn's and Ferrari's, both of whom 
argue that the Symposium was written not for love's own sake but as a tool for Plato's 
other philosophical purposes. Vlastos asserts that this is indeed a play about love, 
although in order to understand Plato's view oflove, we must read Symposium in light of 
his other accounts. 
One objection to Kahn's, Ferrari's and Vlastos' accounts is their exclusive focus on 
Socrates' speech. The result of this move is to charge Plato for being unaware of the 
other six speeches he has written. Both Rutherford and Nussbaum object to Price and 
Vlastos using evidence from the other speeches. Although Nussbaum's account is 
stronger, I will begin with Rutherford's as it lays the foundation for her argument. 
Rutherford (1995: 194) objects that Plato 's metaphysical account oflove in Socrates' 
speech is not recognisably concerned with love - at least to the modem reader and 
suggests that Plato's account is really about "contemplative ecstasy, the enthusiasm of a 
mystic rather than a lover". Socrates' speech changes our perceptions oflove, which is 
not a self-contained activity that is pursued for pleasure, but rather to the "high road to 
salvation ani:! purification"(Rutherford 1995: 194). Rutherford questions whether Plato's 
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account leaves room for the reciprocal feelings of the beloved. The beloved is not so 
much loved for his own sake, but rather as a useful instrument by which the lover can 
pegin his ascent. Rutherford then alludes to Vlastos' objection that Plato "glorifies a 
spiritualised egocentrism" and leaves no room for "private experience, individual 
preference or love of whole persons" (Rutherford 1995: 194). Plato's spiritual ascension, 
in other words, has a high human cost. 
Rutherford (1995: 198) then turns his discussion to Alcibiades' speech, which he 
claims is simplistic to classify as "bad" or "wrong" and Socrates' speech as "right". 
Rather, he argues that Plato has deliberately contrasted two different characters that 
represent incompatible ways of thinking and living. Alcibiades' late entry is an important 
structural marker in the Symposium. It can be read in two ways: either he has missed 
everything - including, perhaps, the 'truth' of love - or he supplies what is missing from 
the account and thus offers the case for other side. Rutherford points out that Plato does 
not conclude the Symposium with the triumph of Socrates speech fresh in our minds, but 
rather with Alcibiades' speech about his physical longings. The effect is that Socrates' 
metaphysical aspirations are qualified by Alcibiades' physical account. Rutherford 
believes that this is Plato's way ofretuming to the real world - a world in which humans 
have physical drives and desires. Thus, Rutherford claims that we need to read these two 
speeches as complements of each other if we are to understand Plato's theory oflove. 
Socrates' Speech Alcibiades' Speech 
His speech is dialectical and systematic. His speech is disorderly, chaotic, and 
unstructured. 
He is inspired by passionate desire that is He is inspired by passionate desire that is 
guided by reason. guided by emotion (and alcohol). 
He is detached from his own emotions. He is absorbed in his own feelings of 
shame, longing, and resentment. 
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He says very little of everyday life and is His speech coptains many particulars that 
rather focussed on the highest aspirations evoke a very clear image of Socrates' way 
pf human creativity. of life (what he looks like, style of speech 
and so on). 
He describes the intellectual ascent to the He describes the world of physical 
ideal of beauty. pleasure. 
His account tends towards the universal. His account rejoices in the particular. 
(Rutherford 1995: 199) 
Perhaps one of the strangest features of Alcibiades's speech is that he reverses the 
traditional ancient Greek roles of the erastes and the eromenos, emphasising his inverted 
scheme of values, and reinforcing the absurdity of his position (Rutherford 1995: 203). 
However, as Alcibiades discusses Socrates' life in vivid details, Socrates' strangeness 
becomes more apparent. He compares Socrates to a satyr or silenus, implying that he is 
an unrealistic character with non-human characteristics. Hence Rutherford (1995: 204) 
questions whether the Socratic ideals can ever convince weaker and more worldly 
followers.) B 
Because Alcibiades' and Socrates' speeches are complementary, Rutherford believes 
that both speeches offer valuable insights into love. Socrates' speech presents an ideal to 
strive towards, although the reader may have difficulty in understanding the path of the 
ascent to Beauty. Although it is easy to criticise Alcibiades' emotional outburst, as 
embodied readers in a physical world, we are more likely to relate to Alcibiades' 
position. While Socrates speech describes the general nature of love, Alcibiades 
describes the particular experience of it. 
Nussbaum (1986) extends Rutllerford's account by offering an even stronger case for 
Alcibiades' speech. She believes that we should read the Symposium against the real lives 
18 Perhaps Socrates' speech is aimed at the converted in the same way that Aristotle aimed his 
Nichmachean Ethics to those people who already had good upbringings. 
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of the characters, and not as a text isolated from its context. Nussbaum (1986: 167) 
argues that this is a play about "passionate erotic love", although she claims, "this is not 
?lways evident from the criticism that has been written about it". Nussbaum (1986: 167) 
agrees with Vlastos' objection that Plato ignores the value of love between individuals, 
although, she points out that this charge is only applicable if one focuses exclusively on 
Socrates' speech. Vlastos' objection implies that Plato was unaware of the other six 
speeches he has written. 
Nussbaum, on the other hand, argues that we should read the whole of what Plato has 
written, and attempt to make sense of the Symposium by finding the meaning that 
emerges from the arrangements of its parts. She focuses on three speeches: 
Aristophanes', Socrates' and A1cibiades', arguing that Socrates' speech on goodness is 
central while Aristophanes' and A1cibiades' speeches offer the most serious objections to 
Socrates' programme for the ascent of 10ve.Nussbaum argues that Aristophanes' myth 
captures both the wholeness and uniqueness of eros that Vlastos accused the SymposiulII 
of lacking. 
However, Nussbaum (1986: 174) also points out how this myth demonstrates "the 
sheer contingency of love, and our vulnerability to contingency through love". Nussbaum 
questions how something like love that is so vital to our goodness can simply be a matter 
of chance. Aristophanes' myth leaves no place for practical reason and this is why 
Nussbaum thinks that it fails as an adequate account of eros. 
In her discussion of Aristophanes' speech, Nussbaum (1986: 176) writes that in the 
myth "eros is the desire to be a being without any contingent occurant desires" and that it 
is a "second-order desire that all desires be cancelled". She refers to this as the "self-
cancelling character of eros", and questions whether we are willing to "risk immobility 
for love"? As humans we would like to find a way to retain our identity as desiring and 
moving beings, and at the same time, maintain our self-sufficiency. 
Nussbaum then turns her attention to Socrates' speech, which accommodates practical 
reason. I will not elaborate on her explanation of this speech, as her insights are very 
similar to earlier accounts I have described. She reiterates how the lover's final 
"contemplative activity" meets the Republic's standards of value in every way 
(Nussbaum'1986: 182). At the summit of the ascent we are engaged in a "stable activity" 
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in which our objects are "unalloyed, pure, unmixed" (Nussbaum 186: 182). Through the 
ascent we are able to achieve a "blissful contemplative completeness" (Nussbaum 1986: 
~ 83). We will ascend into a world in which erotic activity, as we understand it, will not 
exist. In this way, eros a "longing to end all longing" reaches its goal. 
Nussbaum's project, however, involves considering Plato's characters in the context 
of their real lives, and she turns her discussion to the life of Socrates. This is important 
because Socrates is the living example of what Diotima can only abstractly explain. 
Socrates is Plato's example ofa man in the process of making himself self-sufficient. In 
the Symposium Plato paints a vivid picture of Socrates' physical and intellectual traits . 
From the beginning of the play we are aware of his distinct qualities - forgetfulness, self-
absorption, abstinence from sex, and physical ugliness. We see a picture of a man whose 
mind and body are unique in that he is able to distance himself from his bodily desires. 
In fact, Socrates seems almost inhuman, and according to Nussbaum (1986: 184), 
"weird". She points out that although we are "awestruck" by his super-human qualities, 
we are also queasy at his bizaneness. Nussbaum questions whether this is a life that any 
human would really want. 
Nussbaum (1986: 184) then turns her attention to Alcibiades who anives at the scene 
of the dinner party, bearing a "revelation,,1 9. His beautiful physical presence is felt and 
contrasted with the "rarefied contemplative world of the self-sufficient philosopher", as 
his entrance jolts the reader back into the physical world of "mixed impurity of mortal 
flesh" (Nussbaum 1986: 184). He shares his understanding of eros that he has achieved 
through his own personal experience, and through his descriptive nanative attempts to 
make the audience feel, from the inside, what it is like to actually be in love. 
His speech is jumbled and contradictory but according to Nussbaum (1986: 187), it is 
exactly this "groping, somewhat chaotic character" that makes his speech a "movingly 
convincing" account and expression of love. For Alcibiades whose youth was epitomised 
by his narcissism and self-absorption, love has allowed him to experience a "sudden 
openness" and also "an overwhelming desire to open" (Nussbaum 1986: 188). This 
image of "opening up" has both sexual and intellectual connotations. A1cibiades' speech 
19 Nussbaum contrasts this revelation with the revelation of Diotima's ascent. 
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demonstrates the structural parallels between sexual desire and the desire for wisdom, as 
both are directed towards objects in the world and aim at possession. 
A1cibiades' speech also alludes to Socratic knowledge, which is a particular kind of 
knowledge that Nussbaum (1986: 191) describes as "knowing how", which is neither 
propositional knowledge nor knowledge by acquaintance. Knowing how is a kind of 
practical understanding that "consists in the keen responsiveness of intellect, imagination, 
and feeling to the particulars of a situation" (Nussbaum 1986: 191). A1cibiades knows 
Socrates, although his speech suggests that without physical intimacy, a certain part of 
practical understanding is lost to him. 
Nussbaum also points out that A1cibiades' account defends 'physicalism' of the souls 
of lovers: he describes how he is "inwardly bitten" and how his soul is "very like body", 
and appeals to the subjective experience of suffering. A1cibiades' speech is a powerful 
account of what it is like to be in love, and to be rejected. He is a victim of hubris as he is 
mocked and dishonoured for being the "comic poet of his own disaster" (Nussbaum 
1986: 194-195). Alcibiades' speech raises the issue of the activities associated with eros, 
both internally and in relation to the lover's plan. A1cibiades represents a man gripped by 
his passions like a victim of slavery or madness. His account shows how attributing value 
to an unstable external object, like another individual as opposed to the Forms, leads to 
the corresponding activity being unstable too. 
Nussbaum (1986: 198) argues that in the Symposium, Plato presents two mutually 
exclusive world views: on the one hand, we can strive for true goodness in which the 
object of our love is the Form of Goodness, or we can experience the pleasure of the 
opened and unstable body. One can have knowledge of the Good or knowledge of the 
flesh, but not both at the same time. 
Thus, Nussbaum (1986: 198) thinks it is an "alarming" and "ambiguous" book 
because Plato forces the reader to see that whatever path they choose they will be 
sacrificing one type of beauty. Although Plato depicts this choice, he simultaneously 
takes away our power to make it. We cannot choose Alcibiades' vision with full 
knowledge of Socrates' vision, yet we could not embark on the ascent if we feel that we 
are sacrificing a beauty. As Nussbaum (1986: 198) puts it, the play "floods us with light 
but takes away our action". The implication is that "philosophy is not fully human; but 
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that we are terrified of humanity and what it leads to" and that this is the human tragedy 
(Nussbaum 1986: 198). 
3.5 Plato's conception of love 
Symposium is certainly a work about eros, translated as passionate erotic love. I believe 
that it is a mistake to only read and analyse Socrates' speech. Although, I do believe that 
this is the core of the play, the other speeches all contribute to Plato's image oflove-
barring Agathon's who is refuted by Socrates. Although Rutherford and Nussbaum offer 
strong cases for a positive reading of Alcibiades' speech, I argue that Plato included it in 
support of Socrates' account in order to show why love is not Alcibiades' kind of love. 
Socrates' speech describes Plato's distinctive image of love, which fits into his other 
theoretical frameworks and repeats previous analytic patterns. Love, here, is an ascent 
from the love ofa particular body to the love of the Form of Goodness, the object most 
worthy of our love is the Fornl Beauty. Love of the Forms leads to a life of completeness 
and spiritual self-fulfilment, and it is a stable activity, in which enlightenment is possible. 
As Nussbaum (1986: 182) writes, the ascent of love "meets the Republics' standards of 
value" in every way. Thus, I believe that the ascent passage (although mysterious in 
many ways) is Plato's ideal i.e. this is the sort of love that humans should strive to have 
in their lives. 
It is important, however, to consider the characters in the context of their real lives. 
Plato presents Socrates as a living example of a human who is in the process of the 
ascent. Socrates has transcended love of the individual and loves abstract things like 
philosophy and wisdom. Alcibiades, on the other hand, is depicted as a slave to his bodily 
desires, and a victim of mockery and hubris. Not only is he made to look like a fool, and 
rejected by Socrates, but also in real life his projects came to tragic ends. Nussbaum 
(1986: 166) writes, "his story is, in the end, a story of waste and loss, of failure of 
practical reason to shape a life". Given these details, it is evident that Plato's believes that 
the love ought to look like love at the summit of the ascent. 
Thus, there are good reasons to believe that Socrates' speech represents Plato's view 
oflove. The next chapter explores various Foodist responses to Plato's description of 
love as love of the Forms. 
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Chapter 4 
A Foodist Rereading of Plato's Symposium 
4.1 Chapter introduction 
In this chapter I use the foodist manifesto as a foundation to critique Plato's conception 
of love in the Symposium. There are three main sections in this chapter. First, for the sake 
of argument, I accept that love for Plato is love of the Forms, and then raise foodist 
objections to his account. In section two, I offer a positive account ofa foodist's 
conception oflove, while in section three, I challenge my third chapter's conclusion and 
argue that Plato's conception of love involves more than love of the Forms. Through a 
foodist re-reading of the Symposium. I show that Plato's theory oflove can accommodate 
certain foodist conceptions. The purpose of this chapter is not only to offer a 
philosophical analysis of love, but also to show how foodist philosophy can enter into 
dialogue with traditional philosophy and simultaneously be a tool to critique it. 
4.2 Plato's conception oflove: burnt 
In my third chapter I offered a detailed analysis of Plato 's Symposium and discussed the 
varied interpretations of it. I concluded that we should read Socrates' speech as central to 
the dialogue, and Plato's ultimate vision oflove. For Plato, the most worthy object of our 
love is the Form Beauty, and through its contemplation we will access the Form 
Goodness and achieve happy and enlightened lives. This structure fits into his other 
accounts and complements his overall philosophical framework. I will now offer foodist 
reasons for why Plato's view oflove is not useful and insightful. 
a) First Foodist Objection: Focus on the Ordinary 
A central foodist assumption is that philosophers should focus on the ordinary, which can 
yield insights into our human nature. The first main foodist objection to Plato's account 
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of love is that the goal of his ascent is anything but ordinary. Platonic Fonns are difficult 
to define and understand, and according to Plato, few will have access to them. 
Love is a universal human experience, and a necessary condition for the good life. As 
something so central to the human condition, can we then really take Plato seriously 
when he advocates this extraordinary and abstract conception of love? Especially as on 
his account, few people will ever get to experience it. It may be argued that Plato is 
offering an ideal, and that his conception is something that we should all strive for, even 
if it is in vain for many people. A foodist, on the other hand, would disagree with this line 
of reasoning and argue that rather than looking for abstract and extraordinary objects to 
love, we should look at concrete and ordinary objects to which we all have access. 
Another objection that a foodist would raise to Plato, is his focus on beauty. For Plato, 
love of one beautiful body is the impetuous for the ascent. Given the foodist's framework 
of valuing the ordinary, she would question why it is necessarily a beautifitl body that 
attracts us. Is it not possible to fall in love with ordinary attributes - perhaps even ugly 
ones? Implicit in Plato's account, is unattractive people will never be desired or loved. 
However, this does not reflect the world in which we live, as people of all kinds (beauties 
and beasts) experience eros. Perhaps Plato did not exclusively mean bodies in the 
physical sense, but people with beautiful souls or personalities too? But even this 
qualification cannot deny this objection because many immoral, boring and stupid people 
have ignited eros in others. 
Although this objection may seem superficial, it reflects a deeper worry both raised by 
Vlastos (1999) and Nozick (1989). Vlastos (1999: 161) argues that Plato's account of 
love does not allow for love of whole persons, but only of the abstract version of their 
best qualities. According to Vlastos, Plato's account leaves no room for love of an entire 
individual, 'warts and all'. 
Similarly, Nozick (1989: 75) argues that Plato's account implies that we love afeature 
of a person, rather than the individual himself, in their entirety. He argues that loving 
someone simply for their beauty is like loving them for their money. Nozick (1989: 76) 
argues that if this were the case of how we loved others, then we would constantly be 
"trading up" for people who have more of the quality we love and "this does not fit with 
our attitude oflove" or how we experience it. 
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Hence, this objection captures the foodist's belief that love, although necessary for the 
good life, can be found and experienced in ordinary things, like ordinary fallible human 
beings. Plato's emphasis on the ascent, beginning with a beautiful body and climaxing at 
the Form Beauty, misses the ordinary experience of love. 
b) Second Foodist Objection: Eating Emphasises the Body 
Foodists believe that eating is one of the most fundamental human activities. Therefore, 
the body and embodied subjectivity are valued. A second foodist objection to Plato's 
account of love is that it is far too abstract. Barring A1cibiades' speech, the other six 
speeches, particularly Socrates', are focused on abstractions. Foodists aim to revalue 
physical activities that are transitory or temporary. 
Although the ascent begins with the desire for a beautiful body, the body is soon 
replaced by the love of abstract things like mathematical proofs and philosophy. A 
foodist would not deny that one could feel eros for these abstract phenomena, although a 
foodist would not value them above love for a body. 
In my third chapter, I briefly discussed how Socrates was the living example of a 
human being in the midst of the ascent. Socrates is the concrete example of what Diotima 
can only describe in the abstract. However, A1cibiades (Symposium 221c-d) points out: 
... what's absolutely astonishing about this man [Socrates] is his uniqueness: 
there's no human being, fi'om times past or present, who can match him ... But this 
man is so out of the ordinary that however hard you look you'll never find anyone 
from any period who remotely resembles him ... All you can do, in fact, is what I 
did, and compare him and his arguments not to any human being, but to Sileni 
and Satyrs. 
Although, Socrates may be Diotima's concrete example of a man making the ascent, her 
example is unsatisfactory because Socrates is so "un-human" that no one can really relate 
to him or fully understand him. Nussbaum (1986: 183-184) describes in detail how 
"weird" Socrates is: he is "forgetful of the world", he sees himself as a "being whose 
mind is distinct from his body", and whose "personality in no way identifies itself with 
the body and the bodies adventures". For example, Alcibiades describes how Socrates 
was able to sleep naked next to him without getting aroused, and is immune to the effects 
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of alcohol. Socrates' self-sufficiency makes him like a stone statue and very similar to a 
Form itself, "hard, indivisible, unchanging" Nussbaum (1986: 195). 
If Socrates were indeed an example of a person making the ascent and becoming self-
sufficient, then a foodist would say that self-sufficiency, at the loss of bodily pleasure is a 
bad deal. To deny the role of the body in living is a deeply flawed approach to life, 
according to foodists. The fact that Socrates is "un-human" reinforces the foodist's point. 
Plato's conception of love ultimately denies the role of the body and the implication is 
that his account can have no bearing on a human life. Foodists would also insist that to 
even strive for an ideal that ignores the value and role of the body, is to be in bad faith 
and in denial about the true human condition. 
c) Third Foodist Objection: Valuing the Particular 
Although eating is a universal human activity, it is also a highly individual activity. For 
this reason, foodists can see the value in the particular. A foodist ethics is based on an 
ethic of care that considers the particular situations rather than general, abstract rules. 
Plato's ascent of love moves from love for a particular body to love of all beautiful 
bodies. Although Plato begins with the particular, he ends with the general. 
Nozick (1989: 81) claims "Plato got the matter reversed". As our love deepens for 
another individual, it is not their general features that we love more but rather their 
particular attributes. You may have been attracted to your lover's sense of humour, but as 
your love grows, you find that you don't love just any sense of humour in general, but 
your lover's particular sense of humour. If your lover is generous, then it becomes love 
of your lover's particular way of being generous. The more we love another individual; 
the more we love their individual traits and qualities. This is another reason why we do 
not simply "trade up" for a better lover. The deeper we love someone, the more we love 
their particularities and this makes them more difficult to replace. Hence, a foodist would 
argue that Plato's move of generalisation in the ascent is an incorrect description of how 
we as humans experience love for other beings. This objection makes the technical 
problems of the ascent clearer. In spite ofDiotima's persuasion, the ascent is not as easy 
and accessible as it initially appears . 
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,d) Fourth Foodist Objection: Relationships 
Foodists assert that as humans we are fundamentally linked to the world and to other 
human beings, We do not exist as autonomous entities, but rather as beings in 
participatory relations with others and the world at large. Given this assumption of 
interconnectedness, a foodist would assert that human beings can never be fully self-
sufficient and that our dependence on others is what makes us human, For this reason, a 
foodist would argue that Plato's goal of the ascent is problematic, unattainable and self-
defeating. 
First; it is problematic because it aims at an existence that is unnatural to the human 
condition. A foodist would claim that to be devoid of other human contact is unnatural 
and opposes our intrinsically social natures, Second, it is unattainable because as humans 
we can never be truly self-sufficient and live in total solitude, Even Socrates, who was 
making the ascent, had yet to reach the climax, and we are often reminded just how 
unique and exceptional Socrates is, If Socrates could not even reach the climax of the 
ascent, what chance does a human being of average intellect have? Third, the ascent is 
self-defeating because it makes no sense to struggle for something that is unattainable, A 
foodist would argue that living the good life means revelling in pleasures of the body and 
mind, and in conviviality with others; and to deny one aspect is to fail to flourish. The 
ascent deprecates the role of the body, and the role of others, and for a foodist this means 
that the good life will never be achieved. 
Although Price's (1989) account attempts to argue for an interpretation of the ascent 
in which the lover and beloved journey together, I think that he misconstrues Plato's 
argument. Nussbaum (1986) offers a stronger argument for how either you love a 
particular body, or you love the Forms, but that it is impossible to love both. The aim of 
the ascent is "blissful contemplative completeness" in which there is no room or need for 
the beloved (Nussbaum 1986: 183), Even if we accept Price's argument, he admits that 
the relationship between the lovers differ remarkably at the base and the climax of the 
ascent. At the climax, the lovers are not focussed on each other, but rather on the abstract 
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forms. Foodists would deny that this situation, as described by Price, represents a loving 
relationship. 
In this first section I discussed foodist objections to Plato's conception oflove in the 
Symposium. In the following section I offer a positive account of how foodists would 
define eros. 
4.3 A Foodist's Conception of Love: simmering 
Eating the World 
I was born with my mouth open .. . 
Entering this juicy world 
Of peaches and lemons and ripe sun 
And the pink and secret flesh of women, 
This world where dinner is in the breath 
Of the subtle desert, 
In the spices of the distance sea 
Which late at night drift over sleep 
I was born somewhere between the brain and the pomegranate, 
With a tongue tasting the delicious textures 
Of hair and hands and eyes; 
I was born out of the heart stew, 
Out of the infinite bed, to walk upon this infinite earth. 
I want to feed you the flowers of ice 
On this winter window, 
The aroma of many soups, 
The scent of sacred candles 
That follows me around this cedar house, 
I want to feed you the lavender 
That lifts out of certain poems, 
And the cinnamon of apples baking, 
And the simple joy we see 
In the sky when we fall in love. 
-Excerpt from the poem by James Tipton, 1995 (cited by Allende 1998: 198) 
Isabel Allende (1998) has written a book entitled Aphrodite, in which she explores the 
close relationship between food and love. In her conclusion she writes: 
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Appetite and sex are the great motivators of history; they preserve and propagate 
the species, they provoke wars and songs, they influt<nce religions, law, and art. 
All of creation is one long uninterrupted cycle of digestions and fertility; 
everything in life is reduced to a process of organisms devouring one another, 
reproducing themselves, dying, fertilising the earth, and being born transformed. 
Allende is not the first writer to acknowledge the close link between eating and love. 
Freud is famous for his psychological theories about the "oral stage" of sexual 
development in which breastfeeding is simultaneously a baby's first sexual experience. I 
have emphasised the link between food and love/sex in order to make it clear how an 
account of eros is relevant to the programme of foodism. I argue that for foodists eros 
necessarily entails sexual intercourse, although it cannot be reduced to it. What will 
become apparent in this section is that the phenomenon of eating is remarkably similar to 
the phenomenon oflove that culminates in sexual intercourse. 
Foodists' primary assumption is that eating is a fundamental human activity. They 
also believe that contemplating the activity of eating leads to profound insights into other 
aspects of human li ves . The close link between eating and sexual intercourse means that 
foodism may be the best style of philosophy to handle an account of eros. Although 
foodism as a style of philosophy can be objected to on the grounds that eating has nothing 
to do with certain subjects - for example mathematical proofs - when it comes to the 
subject of eros, I believe that foodism is the most appropriate style of philosophy to 
address the subject of eros. 
The parallels between eating and sexual intercourse are strikingly evident in Nozick's 
(1989: 55-60) description of eating: 
Eating is an intimate relationship. We place pieces of external reality inside 
ourselves; we swallow them more deeply inside, where they are incorporated into 
our own stuff, our own bodily being of flesh and blood. It is a remarkable fact that 
we tum parts of external reality into our own substance. We are least separate 
from the world in eating ... This raises primal issues. Is it safe to take in? How do 
we come to trust it or find this out? Does the world care enough about us to 
nourish us? ... First awareness is focused upon the activity of taking in the food, 
not simply on the food's qualities. We meet food in the anteroom of the mouth 
and greet it there. We probe and explore it, surround it, permeate it with juices, 
press it with our tongues against the roof of the mouth along the hard ridge 
directly above the teeth, place it under suction and pressure, move it around. We 
kno',\' its texture fully; it holds no secrets or hidden parts. We play with the food, 
we make friends with it, we welcome it inside. We open ourselves, also, to the 
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specific character of the food, to the taste and the texture, and to the inner quality 
of the substance. I want to speak of the purity and dignity ofan apple, the 
explosive joy and sexuality of a strawberry .. .I have not myself tasted that many 
foods, but the times I did seemed a mode of knowing them in their inner 
essence ... I think that many foods open their essence to us in this way and teach 
us ... Eating with awareness also brings powerful emotions: the world as a 
nurturative place; oneself as worthy of receiving such nurturance, excitement, 
primal contact with a nurtrative mother; the security of being at home in the 
world ... The mouth is a versatile arena, the location of eating, speaking, kissing, 
biting .. . 
If one were to replace the object offood with another human being, Nozick's description 
could easily apply to the experience eros that culminates in sexual intercourse. The most 
relevant and similar features between eating and a foodist's conception oflove are: 
Eating Eros for Foodists 
I. Intimate relationship between eater and I. Intimate relationship between lovers. 
food. 
2. Humans are least separate from the 2. Humans are least separate from other 
world in eating. humans when in love and especially in the 
culmination of sexual intercourse. 
3. Food becomes part of our own 3. Through sexual intercourse and 
substance. procreation, the lovers become physically 
part of each other. 
4. Eating is about opening ourselves to the 4. Eros is about opening ourselves to other 
world, which makes us vulnerable to the human beings, which makes us physically 
food we eat. and emotionally vulnerable to the 
individuals for which we feel eros. 
5. Eating is about trusting the food we take 5. Feeling eros is about trusting the other 
111. lover to have reciprocal feelings . 
6. Eating allows us to become 6. Feeling eros allows us to have a 
knowledgeable of food's "inner essence". particular knowledge of our lover; it is a 
model of knowledge that Nussbaum (1986: 
191) refers to as "knowing how". 
7. Eating can create powerful emotions in 7. The experience of eros can create 
us - bliss, disgust, contentment and so on. powerful emotions within us - happiness, 
hatred, shame and so on. 
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I will use these similarities as a basis for my foodist accounr.of eros. First, in an ideal 
foodist's account of eros, both individuals in the relationship would be referred to the 
"lovers" rather than the "lover" and the "beloved". In Plato's account, eros is a one-way 
asymmetrical relation: the lover loves the Forms (i.e. subject loves object or in ancient 
Greek terms the erastes loves the eromenos). In a foodist account of eros it is possible 
for love to be a one-way relation, but this would be an unsuccessful love affair or rather 
an example of a foodist loving an object such as food. In an ideal foodist account, the 
feelings of eros are reciprocated and both lovers are active participants, simultaneously 
acting as the lover and being the beloved. 
An obvious objection to this analogy of eating and eros, is although they both form 
intimate relations with their objects, symmetry of the relations is not identical. In the case 
of eating, it is an asymmetrical relation: the subject eats the object and the object - the 
food - can in no way reciprocate. Whereas in the case of eros, the relation has the 
potential to be symmetrical as the beloved has the capacity to become the lover. 
Korsmeyer (1999: 176) raises a similar point in her discussion of the comparisons 
between "gustatory and sexual appetites". 
Korsmeyer (1999 : 177) claims that a distinction can be drawn between the objects of 
the appetites. She argues that not only is one for food and the other for sex, but that they 
are also parts of different emotions. Sexual appetite can be considered the foundation of 
erotic love and the lover has a particular individual who satisfies their erotic desire. 
Gustatory appetite can be the foundation of sophisticated tastes but also for ordinary likes 
and dislikes and the eater's desire for cheese is not particular as long as the cheese is 
"compositionally identical" (Korsmeyer 1999: 177). Korsmeyer believes that it would be 
an odd eater who attaches desire to that particular piece of cheese and not to another. She 
also points out that sexual desire can also be "general and not specific" but this is rather 
a description of "brute promiscuity" rather the "nobility of romantic love". 
Hence there are two parts to this objection. First, the analogy is problematic because 
the relations between eater:food and lover:lover are not both potentially symmetrical. 
Second, an eater's attachment to her food is a general one, any food of a certain kind will 
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do. Whereas, a lover's attachment to her lover is a particular one, the desire for the lover 
is to be with that particular individual. 
In response to the first part of the objection, a foodist asserts that we need to 
understand eating in a broader sense. Although I have focused on an individual who eats 
food, we could also imagine other relationships between an individual and food . First 
there is a cook who becomes intimately involved with the food she is prepares, for 
example the activity of bread making. Although the cook is the subject, and the bread 
dough the object, the dough is not an object in a sense of being a passive lump of stuff. 
The dough literally responds to the cook - it breathes, rises and reacts to the kneading 
and rolling of the cook's hands. 
Second, eating has also been elevated to the holy and sacred. In many religions, to eat 
a certain food is to eat more than merely the food itself. Christians believe that the 
communion bread is Christ's body and the wine is his blood (not simply representations 
of his body and blood respectively) . Thus, it can be argued that on a spiritual level, the 
food takes on SUbjective qualities and represents more than merely a means to an end. 
On this point, eating for many people holds more than instrumental value. The food is 
valued not only for its nourishing qualities, but for its intrinsic qualities too. People who 
"eat with awareness", as Nozick (1989: 58) would say, have respect for the food they eat 
and value it beyond is usefulness as an object. This point is particularly relevant to 
gourmands like Jean-Anthelme Brillat-Savarin (1970:132) who defines "gourmandism as 
"an impassioned, reasoned, and habitual preference for everything that gratifies the organ 
of taste". For gourmands, food is loved and respected for the pleasure it can give them. 
Third, eating food with a group of people also changes one's relations to food. Eating 
with friends and family is a common way to cement bonds of friendship and love, and to 
create a feeling of well-being in the eaters. The short story Babette's Feast by Isak 
Dinesan, which has been made into an excellent film, is a good example of this point. 
Nozick (1989: 56) discusses how eating food with another person can be a "deep mode of 
sociability". He describes how eating, the act of opening ourselves up to food, allows us 
to drop our boundaries and hence the sharing of a meal can be a truly rewarding and 
happy experience. Nozick (1989: 56) writes: 
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The loving preparation of food, the visual beauty it presents, sensuousness in 
eating, the daily sharing of such meals in leisure and)oveliness - all these can be 
a romantic couple's way of being lovingly together, a way for one or both to 
create a piece of the world they treasure. 
Hence, that food can respond to a cook's hands or that food can be the cause of feelings 
of well-being in the eaters, means that the relation between an individual and food does 
have the capacity to be reciprocal and hence symmetrical. 
In response to the second part of the objection - that eaters love food in its generality 
- I appeal to the idea of gourmands or sophisticated eaters. There are eaters who are very 
particular about the food they consume - only Beluga caviar will do, or wine from 
specific regions because of the particular terroir or only free range chickens for ethical 
reasons and so on. Alternatively, some people will only eat food that is prepared in a 
particular way (Kosher) or by a particular person (their mothers) . In fact, I think that 
some people are more particular or finicky about the food they eat compared to the lovers 
they choose. Therefore, I do not think that Korsmeyer's point poses a fatal objection to 
the analogy of eating and eros. 
Another worry with the analogy is whether eros can simply be reduced to sexual 
appetite. Foodists assert that humans eat rather than feed. In the same way, foodists 
would hold that although there is a physical component to eros, i.e. sexual intercourse, 
eros is not only about sexual gratification. Given the foodist's framework of valuing the 
body and all things concrete, foodists would argue that sexual intercourse is one of the 
best ways of expressing eros for another human being. Phrased slightly differently, 
sexual intercourse is the climax of the experience of eros. 
Sexual intercourse is also important for foodists because it is through sexual 
intercourse that we tangibly experience our connectedness to and dependence on other 
human beings. Not only is our relationship with our lover physically intimate, but it is 
emotionally intimate too. For Nozick (1989: 82) "romantic desire is to forn1 a we with 
that particular person and with no other". Nozick's idea of eros being the desire to form a 
"we" captures the foodists idea that eros is about forming an intimate relation with 
another human. The relationship is so intimate that Nozick argues that we need to 
understand )oVe in the strongest sense of the notion of identity - just as I cannot have 
71 
multiple individual identities, so too I cannot have multiple we identities. In a we, I share 
my identity with my lover and for this reason it is evident that loving another human is 
pot simply about a physical connection. Nozick describes how when I love someone, my 
well-being is tied up with his well-being. 
When we eat, we physically and sometimes intellectually open ourselves up to the 
ingestion of the food. I say "intellectually" because sometimes we have to be persuaded 
to try an exotic dish and hence have to be open to listen to the reasons for how a certain 
food is tasty or healthy. Similarly, a foodist would claim that an individual has to be 
"open" to experience eros. Love is about letting down our emotional and physical 
boundaries so that another human may enter emotionally, intellectually and physically. It 
is important to be "open" to one's lover, because loving another human is about knowing 
them in a unique and intimate way. 
Nussbaum (1986: 191) refers to this model of knowledge as a kind of "knowing how". 
"Knowing how" is about having a personal understanding of your lover's "complex 
network of intellectual, emotional, and bodily needs" (Nussbaum 1896: 191). Loving 
another person means knowing how to touch them, pleasure them, look at them, 
understand their moods and emotions and so on. When we love someone we aim to get to 
know their "intimate essence" or knowledge of as much of their inner-self as possible. By 
"essence" I mean the individuals' qualities, quirks, vulnerabilities, fears, desires and so 
on. Although "knowing how" relies on intimate acquaintance and leads to the ability to 
tell truths, it is a unique model of knowledge that cannot be reduced to propositional 
knowledge or knowledge by acquaintance. 
Foodists also advocate this model of "knowing how" when they attempt to describe 
the knowledge needed to cook certain dishes. Verta Mae Smart-Grosvenor (1992: 294) 
describes her cooking method as "vibration". She says, " .. .1 never measure or weigh 
anything. I can tell by the look or smell of it". According to Heldke (1992: 219), Smart-
Grosvenor's ability to prepare good food "by vibration" reflects her "bodily 
understanding of (and connection with) the foods she's cooking". Smart-Grosvenor's 
method of cooking contrasts with Suppes' (1992) account of recipes. Suppes argues that 
recipes are rational explanations complete with justifications of how to do something. 
Suppes (1992: 236-237) writes how recipes are "non-trivial procedures" that aim at the 
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"preparation offood of a certain quality and taste". Although Suppes makes an 
interesting point about the rationality implicit in all recipes md hence cooking, I think 
that Smart-Grosvenor' s account captures this model of knowledge that Nussbaum refers 
to as "knowing how". This model of knowledge emphasises the centrality of bodily 
experience in learning to cook and also in loving another person. Things like pastry 
making cannot really be taught through words alone, it is an activity that needs to be 
physically shown to the learner. In the same way, Alcibiades was unable to know 
Socrates fully, because he was never physically intimate with him. 
From this brief account of a foodist's conception oflove it is clear that a foodist feels 
passionate desire for another ordinary human. Although a foodist expresses her love 
through her body, it transcends the merely physical. Love for a foodist is about forming a 
we with another person, in which the well-being of both lovers is intimately linked. A 
foodist is open to love, and this openness can lead to great pleasure, but also to 
vulnerability and the possibility of rejection and pain. Love for foodists is not a 
guaranteed stable activity, but this does not pose a problem for them. Eating is not a 
stable activity either because we are never sated, never completely nourished or fulfilled. 
Thus, the foodist does not yearn for a complete or unchanging state, as there is more to 
happiness than permanence. 
With a clear picture of how a foodist understands love, I now discuss whether Plato's 
Symposium contains elements oflove as understood in a foodist way. 
4.4 Plato a Foodist? A New Concoction 
Nussbaum (1986) offers a case for a positive reading of Alcibiades' speech in the 
Symposium. In this section I use many of her insights, asjust as Socrates is commonly 
held to be the archetype of Plato's conception oflove, Alcibiades represents the foodist's 
epitome of love. However, the purpose of this section is not to merely resurrect a case for 
Alcibiades, but also to show how traditional Western Philosophers have misinterpreted 
Plato's conception oflove. I aim to show that it is possible to reread Plato 's SymposiulII 
in such a way that Plato could be considered a foodist, advocating a foodist conception of 
love. 
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Nussbaum (1986: 186) writes: 
Socratic philosophy, then, cannot allow the truths ofA1cibiades to count as 
contributions to philosophical understanding. It must insist that the non-repeatable 
and sensuous aspects of the particular case are irrelevant, even a hindrance to 
correct seeing. And it is not only the philosophy of Socrates against which 
Alcibiades must defend his claim to teach. It is also most of the tradition of ethical 
discourse that got its start with Socrates. Very few moral philosophers, especially 
in the Anglo-American tradition, have welcomed stories, particulars, and images 
into their writing on value. Most have regarded these elements of discourse with 
SuspICIOn. 
Nussbaum illustrates why philosophers tend to focus exclusively on Socrates' speech: the 
assumptions of the analytic tradition blind them to other options, in this case the six other 
speeches, especially Alcibiades'. Thus, there is the need for new styles of philosophy that 
allow us to see old texts in refreshing ways. A foodist rereading of Plato's Symposium 
aims to do just this. 
First, what is most striking about Plato's Symposium is its distinctively foodist 
context: a convivium of men who are at a dinner party. Another salient feature is that 
although this play is recounted through someone who was not even present, the 
characters and their activities vividly depicted. Right from the onset the readers are made 
aware that this play is about real people - not only that they really existed but also that 
they are embodied, living beings. We hear about the dinner they eat, the wine they will 
only drink in limited amounts and then we read about Aristophanes' attack ofhiccoughs 
because he ate too much food! Then Socrates (Symposium 207e) says " ... a person in fact 
never possesses the same attributes, but is constantly being renewed and constantly losing 
other qualities; this goes for his hair, flesh, bones, blood, and body in general. .. " All 
these aspects remind the reader just how human and embodied the characters are. 
The dramatic entrance of Alcibiades - "he stood at the door wearing a chaplet of 
leafy ivy entwined with violets, and with ribbons galore trailing his head" (Symposium 
212e) - drunk and dashing, further reinforces the physical imagery of this play. 
A1cibiades is also the only person to claim to tell the truth about love, although his tool is 
wine: " ... but from now on you'll hear things I wouldn't have told you except that, firstly, 
truth comes from wine ... " (Symposium 2l7e). I do not know how seriously we should 
take this last point but it is important to note how even Plato thinks that one's body and 
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the substances it consumes, affects one's intellect. This point reinforces the 
foregrounding of the body in the Symposium. 
Second, Nussbaum is correct in claiming that it is wrong to focus exclusively on of the 
Socrates' speech. The problem with basing Plato's view of love on this speech is that 
Socrates does not have this knowledge from his own experience, but Diotima has merely 
persuaded him. Although we can hypothesise that Socrates is somewhere up the ladder of 
love, he certainly has not reached the ascent. Although, Socrates account neatly fits into 
Plato's other analytic patterns, this is not reason enough to assume that this is Plato's only 
conception oflove. 
A feature of the Symposium is the stmctural distancing or "elaborately nested reports" 
(Nussbaum 1986: 167). It is narrated by Apollodorus to a friend some years later. 
Apollodorus was not present at thi s dirmer party but claims that he heard about it from his 
friend, Aristodemus. Nussbaum (1986: 168) suggests the reason for this narrative 
distancing is that Plato is making us aware of the "fragility of our knowledge of love" and 
"our need to grope for understanding". If this is indeed the case, then perhaps Plato did 
not have one fixed idea about love, and his creation of the seven speeches is merely an 
attempt to cache out a few of his conflicting ideas. 
Aristophanes' speech about the quest for the soul mate also emphasises the role of the 
body and sexual intercourse in eros. His speech depicts the intimate and unique 
relationship that lovers form. Aristophanes' mythical human creatures could be an 
example ofNozick's ideal instantiation of the we that is formed through love. His speech 
reflects the intellectual, emotional and physical bonds we experience when we are in the 
throes oflove. 
Alcibiades' speech is a fine example of "opermess" to love. In this play, his opermess 
leaves him vulnerable and rejected, as he is a victim of hubris. However, it is important 
to remember that although Plato depicted Alcibiades' love affair as doomed - this does 
not mean that it is necessarily the case that all love affairs of this nature will have an 
unhappy ending. Perhaps the unhappy ending is Plato's attempt to avoid romanticising 
love as Agathon does. Comte-Sponville (2003: 258) cautions against the "intoxication of 
love", whilst asking "what could be easier to love than a dream? What could be harder to 
love than reality?" Perhaps Alcibiades tragic love story is Plato's way of being realistic 
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about the risks of loving another human being. However, just because an activity is risky, 
does not necessarily mean it is unworthy of pursuit. A1cibiades also shows how lovers 
~an have intimate knowledge of each other. However, his failed attempt to have a 
physical relationship with Socrates suggests that certain knowledge about Socrates is lost 
to Alcibiades (Nussbaum 1896: 191). 
Nussbaum (1986 : 194) discusses how A1cibiades' crown of ivy is symbolic of 
Dionysus - god of wine and irrational inspiration and how he is the god of annual ritual 
death and rebirth: a "cutting back and resurgence, like the plant, like desire itself'. He is 
the only god who is not self-sufficient; he is acted on by the world. However, in spite of 
his vulnerability, he restores himself every year. Nussbaum (1986 : 195) points out that 
this might be Plato's way of saying that "an unstable city, an unstable passion, might 
grow and flourish in a way truly appropriate to a god". Even though Socrates rejects 
A1cibiades, A1cibiades still has the chutzpah to flirt with and tease Agathon. Perhaps this 
is Plato is suggesting that even if one love affair fails - there can always be others. 
One might object however, that in Plato's early work he clearly contrasts "sympotic 
values" (i.e. pleasures of eating, drinking and love-making) with real virtue, arguing that 
the Guardians have the duty to rise above such pleasures (Tecu~an 1990: 240). Tecu~an 
(1990 : 238) argues that throughout Plato's works, he denigrates the sympotic institutions 
and that "he revealed himself scarcely inclined to accept the hedonistic reality of such a 
practice". Even in the Symposium, Socrates needs to be invited twice and then he wanders 
in aloof and late for dinner. 
However, Tecu~an (1990: 244) argues that in Plato's last works - Laws - there is a 
change in attitude towards symposia. She claims that these books aim at a "complete 
restoration of the sympotic custom". Her evidence lies in the contrast in the two analogies 
used by Plato. In the Republic "democratic leaders appear as evil wine-pourers who 
quench the people's thirst for freedom with vile intoxication", while in the sixth book of 
the Laws the most desirable form of government is described using a comparison with 
wine-mixing (Tecu~an 1990: 244). Tecu~an (1990: 245) believes that Plato's change in 
attitude towards symposia reflects his change in understanding of the human soul. 
Plato came to view the human soul as a mixture of rational dispositions and deep 
irrationality. Tecu~an believes that this point can be substantiated with a close reading of 
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Platos' Laws in which there is a deeper interest in drinking parties than in any of his 
earlier works. Tecu~an (1990: 246) argues that Plato came to the realisation that" the 
human community, with its "deeply irrational nature", could not be brought to virtue by 
purely rational means. In the Laws Plato seems to advocate symposia or conviviality as 
the "aptest form for revealing the truth". He also changed his views about wine and 
drinking, and according to Tecu~an (1990: 251) seems to suggest two functions of wine: 
to arouse deep irrationality, and also create the "aptest state of the mind for education". 
Ifwe are to be persuaded by Tecu~an's (1990: 257) argument that Plato did indeed 
end his career with a "more realistic view of the human soul", we can certainly see a 
positive case for a foodist rereading of Plato's Symposium. Perhaps it was this work and 
its contemplation about love that was the catalyst for Plato's change of heart, or perhaps 
love was the one subject that just would not realistically map onto his analytic pattern of 
the Forms. Socrates speech certainly attempts this feat, but Alcibiades exposes the futility 
of Socrates' vision. 
In conclusion, the aim of this chapter was to offer a soup90n of foodist philosophising 
and I trust that it has whet the philosophical appetite. 
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